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ABSTRACT 
Perhaps the purest form of citizen political expression is addressing 
a government body directly during the public-comment period. Despite 
its salutary civic benefits, the public-comment period faces escalating 
threats, with local elected officials imposing rigid controls on speakers . 
Disturbingly , these rules sometimes are enforced via arrest . The U.S. 
Supreme Court recently confronted this scenario in Lozman v. City of 
Riviera Beach, involving the arrest of a citizen-critic who refused to 
stop using his city council's open-mic period to decry public corruption . 
While narrowly fact-specific, the Court 's June 2018 resolution of the 
case reaffirms the importance of protecting speakers at government 
bodies against retaliation for disagreeable views. This Article surveys 
recent instances in which speakers addressing government bodies were 
silenced- at times, forcibly-and how courts address both facial and 
as-applied challenges to restrictions on public comment . The Article 
also examines the constitutionality of commercially available standard-
form policies increasingly adopted by local governments to restrict 
"insulting" speech, "personal attacks ," and other citizen criticism . It 
proposes taking the next logical step that the Lozman Court hesitated 
to take -n amely, recognizing a framework to help courts assess all First 
Amendment retaliation claims by speakers punished for noncompliance 
with content- or viewpoint-based directives to refrain from speaking . 
Ultimately, the Article concludes that the simple burden-shifting 
analysis that the Court found applicable under Fane Lozman's unique 
set of facts -in which it is the speaker 's burden to establish a prima 
facie case of a speech-punitive cause -and-effect -i s in fact the 
appropriate standard for all such retaliation claims , so that the 
existence of an independent basis for arrest does not mechanistically 
defeat a speaker's claim where a retaliatory motive is proven. 
INTRODUCTION 
"I found the video pretty chilling. I mean, the fellow is up there for 
about fifteen seconds, and the next thing he knows, he 's being led off in 
... handcuffs, speaking in a very calm voice the whole time. "1 
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 
S. Ct . 1945 (2018) (No. 17-21); see Jane Musgrave, U.S. Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Calls Fane Lozman 's Arrest 'Chilling, ' PALM BEACH POST 
(Feb . 28, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.mypalmb eachpost.com/n ews/ 
crime -law/ supreme-court-chief-j ustice-calls-fane-lozman-arrest-chilling/ 
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That 's how Chief Justic e John Rob erts describ ed a video2 depicting 
Fane Lozman 's arrest for speaking out at a 2006 meeting of the city 
council of Riviera Beach , Florida .3 Lozman , "a Marin e turn ed multi-
million aire inventor turned thorn in th e side of Riviera Beach officials , "4 
relish es "rattling city cages ."5 For instanc e, th e "ind efatig able gadfly "6 
and "relentless oppon ent of public corruption "7 scored a victory in 2013 
before th e nation 's high court after Riviera Beach imp ermissibly 
classifi ed Lozma n 's floating hom e as a "vesse l" under a federal statute 
and destroy ed it. 8 
But th e images that Roberts found so "chilling " arose out of a 
different clash betw een Lozman and his hom etown . This disput e 
involv ed Lozman 's civil-rights claim und er 42 U.S .C. § 19839 that he 
5AMmiBHaVolL1Fh0b6XLAO/ [htt ps://pe rma.cc /6 QMY-PYAF ] (describing 
oral argument in the case). 
2. Scanshift , Activist Arrest ed at Riviera Beach City Council Meeting, YouT UBE 
(Sept. 15, 2009), https: //www.yo utube.com /watc h?v=8 Dqpvh6 _ z0g 
[http s://pe rma .cc/6F4N-HPA4]. 
3. Musgrave , supra not e 1. 
4. Jane Musgrave, Riviera Man Wins U.S. High Court Case, PALM BEACH 
POST, Jan. 16, 2013, at lA. 
5. Jane Musgrave, Supreme Court Winner Tackling Riviera Again, PALM 
BEACH POST, Sept. 1, 2014, at lA . 
6. Adam Lipta k, This 'Tenacious Underdog' Won His First Supreme Court 
Case. Now He's Back., N.Y . TIMES (Dec . 4, 2017) , http s://www.nyt imes. 
com/2017 / 12/ 04/ us/ politi cs/s upr eme-court-first- amendm ent-fr eedom-of-
speech-arrest. html [https://per ma.cc/ JCD7-N 3FS] . 
7. Robert Barnes, Justic es to See a Familiar Face in Battl e Over Speech Rights , 
WASH. POST, Feb . 26, 2018, at Al. 
8. Lozman v. City of Riviera Bea ch , 568 U.S. 115, 118-20 (2013). 
9. This statute provid es , in relevant part: 
[e]very person who , und er color of any stat ut e, ordinance , regulation, 
custom , or usage, of any Stat e or Territory or th e Dist rict of Columbia, 
subjects , or causes t o be subjected, any citizen of t he United States or 
other person within the juri sd ict ion thereof to the depri vation of any 
rights, privil eges, or immuniti es secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liabl e to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redres s . . . 
42 U.S .C. § 1983 (2018). 
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was wrongfully arrested in retaliation for exercising his First 
Amendm ent 10 rights of speech and petition .11 
Specifically , Lozman was arrested after council member Elizabeth 
Wad e tri ed to stop him from talking about public corruption during a 
period set aside for public comments .12 In his First Amendm ent 
challenge, Lozman argued that after he refus ed to quit speaking, Wade 
"summon ed Riviera Beach Polic e Officer Francisco Aguirr e, who was 
on duty at th e meeting. Petitioner [Lozman ] told Officer Aguirr e that 
he was not finished speaking . Councilm emb er Wad e th en ord ered th e 
officer to carry him out. At that point petition er was arrested, 
handcuff ed , and removed from the meeting . "13 
Lozman , however, lost his retali atory arrest case before a jury, and 
the U.S. Court of App eals for th e Eleventh Circuit issued an 
unpublish ed opinion in 2017 affirming th e tri al court's decision not to 
disturb th e verdict .14 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
finding of probable cause to arr est automatically defeats a false arrest 
claim brought und er th e First Amendm ent. 15 In Novemb er 2017, th e 
Supr eme Court granted Lozman 's petition for a writ of certiorari .16 It 
fram ed th e issue before it simply: "Does th e exist ence of probabl e cause 
defeat a First Amendment retaliatory-arr est claim as a matter of law?"17 
Lozman 's attorneys contended that while th e existence of probabl e 
cause to mak e an arrest may be relevant in a First Amendm ent-bas ed 
10. Th e First Amendm ent to th e U.S. Constitution provid es, in pertinent 
part, th at "Co ngr ess shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the pre ss." U .S. CONST. ame nd . I. The Free Speech and Free 
Pr ess Clauses were incorpora t ed mor e than nin ety years ago through th e 
Fourt eenth Amendm ent Du e Proc ess Clause as fundam ental libert ies to 
app ly to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
11. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 
1945 (2018) (No . 17-21) ("This case arises from a dispu te over municipal 
policy bet ween petitioner and the City of Rivi era Beach that culmin at ed 
in petition er 's arrest in November 2006. Pet ition er claims that the arre st 
was the product of t he City 's host ility toward his First Amendment-
protected act ivit y ."). 
12. Id . at 6. 
13. Id . (intern al citations omitted). 
14. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach , 681 F. App 'x 746 (11th Cir. 2017) , 
vacated, 138 S. Ct . 1945 (2018). 
15. Id. at 750. 
16. Lozman , 681 F. App 'x 746 (11th Cir. 2017) , cert . grant ed, 138 S. Ct. 1945 
(2018). 
17. Ques t ion Presented, Lozman , 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018) (No. 17-21) , 
SUPREME COURT, https: // www.supr emecourt. gov/ qp / 17-00021qp.pdf 
[http s://pe rm a .cc/ VWL2-57F 3] (last visited Sept. 16, 2018). 
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retaliatory arrest case "it is not dispositive as a matter of law. "18 As 
Pamela Karlan told the Court during oral argument on Lozman 's 
behalf , "[w]e think the best rul e is the rul e we advocated for , which is 
th at probabl e cause is relevant evidence but not always dispositive. "19 
In a Jun e 2018 ruling remarkabl e for its narrown ess, the Court held 
8-1 ( only Justice Clarenc e Thomas dissented) 20 that the conceded 
presenc e of probabl e cause for a misd emeanor arrest did not foreclose a 
First Amendm ent retaliation claim. 21 The Court confined its ruling to 
the facts before th e Court and remand ed th e case to give Lozman an 
opportunity to establish that "th e existence and enforcement of an 
official policy motivat ed by retali ation " was a but-for cause of his 
arrest .22 
Although Lozman 's case is th e one that reached th e Supr eme Court , 
many other citizen commenters have found th emselv es gaveled down or 
even haul ed away in handcuffs because of eith er what they say or how 
they say it. For instance , in February 2018, a woman was forcibly 
remov ed from th e West Virgini a Hous e of Delegates while testifying 
about industry influ ence behind a bill lowering th e st andards to obt ain 
a permit for oil and gas drilling .23 Th e speaker, Lissa Lucas , was 
cautioned not to make "personal comments " about members of the 
Hous e Judiciar y Committe e, but she persist ed in reading a list of 
industry donations to committee members until her tim e expir ed and 
she was dragg ed away. 24 
National outrage followed a Louisi ana t eacher 's January 2018 
ejection from a school-board meeting for speaking up from th e audience 
to question the board 's approval of a larg e pay raise for the 
superintendent .25 Amat eur video of a deputy ushering her out of th e 
18. Repl y Brief for Petitioner at 2, Lozman, 138 S. Ct . 1945 (2018) (No. 
17-21) , https: // www. supr emecourt .gov/ Docket PDF / 17 / 17-21 /35 653 / 
20180216120140682_17-21rb.pdf [http s:/ / perma .cc/ 7C7Q-FTRN ]. 
19. Tran script of Oral Argum ent at 27- 28, Lozman , 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018) 
(No. 17-21), https: //www .supr emecourt.gov / oral_argum ents / ar gument_ 
t ranscript s/ 2017 / 17-21_ ljgm.pdf [http s:/ / perma.c c/ ATU9-QT JH]. 
20. Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1955 (Thom as, J. , dissenting). 
21. Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1955 (majori ty opinion). 
22. Id. at 1954- 55. As Justi ce Anthon y Kennedy wrote for th e majorit y , "[t]he 
Court need not , and does not, address the elements required to prov e a 
reta liato ry arrest claim in other contexts. " Id. at 1955. 
23. Nick Visser, Woman 'Dragged ' From West Virginia Hearing Aft er Listing 
Lawmakers ' Oil and Gas Donors , HUFFINGTON POST (Feb . 12, 2018, 3:18 
AM) , http s: / /www. huffingtonpost .com/ entr y / lissa-lucas-west-virgini a_ us_ 
5a812a88e4b0c6726e14cb0b [https ://perma .cc/Y35B -MKCM ]. 
24. Id . 
25. Merrit Kennedy, Outcry Aft er Louis iana T eacher Arr ested During School 
Board Meeting, NPR (Jan. 10, 2018, 12:40 PM) , https://www .npr.org / 
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meeting and th en roughly handcuffing her in th e hallwa y went viral 
with more than 1.7 million views on YouTub e.26 
In Scarborough , Main e, a 69-year-old man was arrested and charged 
with criminal tr espass in Novemb er 2017 after refusing to cease his 
speech to a town council , ridiculing th e town's courtship of an Amazon 
headquarters and questioning th e town manager 's professional 
background - remarks deemed "disr espectful " in violation of a 
municipal decorum policy .27 A judg e dismiss ed th e tr espass charge after 
the local pros ecutor declined to pursu e it. 28 
A former teach er and school-board candidate was remov ed29 from a 
Brevard County , Florid a, school board meeting and jailed in May 2016 
after he refused to stop making accusations about misconduct by a 
school employ ee.30 A school-board member said th e speaker (who 
accused a t eacher of showing a photograph of his genitals to students 
during a class pr esentation) violat ed a policy forbidding "talking about 
a t eacher ," which is a "personn el matt er and not allowed at Board 
meetings du e to possibl e slander . "31 
As th ese cases illustrat e, government bodi es with low tolerance for 
disagr eeable speech are pushing - and sometimes crossing -
constitutional boundaries in managing citizen speech. Clear standards 
are needed to minimi ze th e risk of overzea lous ejections and arrests . 
In its 2018 term , th e Court has th e chance to clarify the broader 
constitutional question unr esolved by Lozman: wheth er th e exist ence of 
probabl e cause for any misd emeanor offense categorically defeats a 
speaker's First Am endm ent claim of retaliatory arrest. Although th e 
case th e Court accepted, Nieves v. Bartl ett,32 is (as discuss ed lat er) ill-
sections/ thetwo-way / 2018/01/10/577010534/ outcry-after-louisiana-teacher-
arrested-d uring-school-board-meeting [htt ps: / /pe rma.cc /3 97S-SJ79]. 
26. Id . 
27. Julie tte Laaka, Judge Rebuffs Scarborough 's Attempt to Resurre ct Doyle 
Case, FORECASTER (May 23, 2018), http: / /www.t heforecaster.net/ judg e-
rebuffs-scarboroughs-attempt-to-resurrect-doyle-case / #res pond [https: / / 
perma.cc/S8D3-H9D6]. 
28. Id . 
29. Jessic a Chasmar, Florida School Board Candidate Haul ed Out of Public 
Meeting by Police After Saying 'Penis,' WA SH. TIM ES (May 25, 2016) , 
https: // www.w as hingtontim es .com/ news/2 016/ may /25/ dean-pat era kis-
florida-school-bo ard-candid ate -haul [http s: / /pe rma .cc/ RPX3-BU5Z ]. 
30. Ilana Kowars ki, Br evard School Board Candidate Arr ested During LGBT 
M eeting , FLA. TODAY (May 25, 2016, 6:40 PM) , htt ps:// www. 
florida today .com/ story/ news/ educa t ion/ 2016 / 05 / 24/ school-board-packed-
lgbt-m eet ing/848 14172 / [http s:/ /pe rma. cc/ QJM7-J7 A 7]. 
31. Chasmar, supra not e 29. 
32 . See Bartlett v. Nieves, 712 F. App 'x 613 (9th Cir. 2017) , cer t. granted sub 
nom. Nieves v. Bartl ett, 138 S. Ct. 2709 (2018). 
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suited for broad pronounc em ents becaus e of its unusual facts , it 
nev ertheless offers th e opportunity to establish some governing 
principl es allowing speakers to pursu e claims against ill-moti va t ed 
government offici als whil e simultaneously shielding rank-and-file police 
officers forc ed into spur -of-th e-mom ent judgm ent calls . 
Part I of this Articl e initially revi ews the importance of political 
expr ess ion und er th e First Am endm ent and the strict scrutiny standard 
of revi ew to which content-based restrictions on speech generally are 
subject. 33 Nex t , Part II examines th e long-standing principle against 
viewpoint discrimination on speech, as well as th e public forum 
doctrin e.34 Part III th en considers th e primar y rationales for r estricting 
speech at government m eetings .35 Part IV addr esses th e void for 
vagu eness doctrin e and prior restraint regim es impos ed on speakers .36 
Part V then presents a brief case study of a government policy impos ed 
on speakers at public meetings .37 Nex t , Part VI turns to th e hea rt of 
the Article , examining th e constitutionality of punishing commenters. 38 
Finally , this Article concludes by calling on th e U.S . Supr em e Court to 
offer clea r guidance about when th e expression of citizen-critics at 
public meetings can permissibl y be squelched and to r ecogni ze that th e 
burd en ultimat ely remains on government officials to abide by such 
principl es when confronted with speech th ey find disagr eea bl e.39 
I. POLITICAL SP EEC H , STRICT SCR UTINY & TH E FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Safeguarding poli t ica l speech is a fundamen ta l purpose of the First 
Amendmen t. 40 The Supreme Court ob served more than fort y yea rs ago 
that: 
[w]hatev er differences may exist about interpret at ions of the First 
Amendment , there is practic ally universal agreement that a major 
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discu ssion of 
governmental affairs . This of course includes discu ssions of 
33 . Infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text. 
34 . Infra not es 59- 104 and accompanying t ext . 
35. Infra notes 105-167 and accompanying text . 
36 . Infra not es 168- 189 and accompanying t ext . 
37. Infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text . 
38 . Infra not es 201- 271 and accompanying t ext. 
39 . Infra notes 272-27 4 and accompanying text . 
40. Se e Jeffrey Evans Stak e, Ar e We Buy ers or Hosts ? A Memetic Approach 
to the First Amendment , 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213, 1245 (2001) (noting that 
"political speech which, being necessary to democra cy, lies at the heart of 
the constitution al prot ect ion ") . 
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candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in 
which government is operat ed or should be operate d, and all such 
mat t ers relat ing to politi ca l proc esses .4 1 
More r ecently , Justice Anthony Kenn edy explain ed for th e m ajority 
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 42 that "[s]p eech is 
an esse nti al mechanism of democracy , for it is th e mea ns to hold officials 
accountable to th e peopl e ."43 The recently retired justic e added that 
"political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it , 
wh eth er by design or inadv ert ence " and not ed that laws restricting 
politic al speech must survive th e Court 's typically rigorous strict 
scrutiny standard of review.44 
Und er strict scrutiny, a regulation will be uph eld only if th e 
government prov es it has a compelling int erest that is served by 
narrowly tailor ed t erms 45 that r estrict no mor e speech than is absolutely 
necessa ry to serve the inter est .46 Strict scrutiny applies when speech is 
restrict ed beca us e of th e topic or id eas in qu estion .47 A mor e relax ed 
form of judicial review - int erm ediat e scrutiny - generally applies to 
content-neutral regulations .48 Und er int erm ediate scrutiny, a content-
41. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218- 19 (1966). 
42. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) . 
43 . Id . at 339. 
44. Id . at 340. 
45. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (observing t hat 
"content-based restrictions on speech " are permissible only "if t hey 
survive strict scrutiny," and noting th at str ict scrutiny requires a 
compelling government interest and a statute that is narrow ly ta ilored to 
serve t hat intere st); United States v. Playboy Entm 't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 
813 (2000) ("If a stat ute regulates speech based on its cont ent, it must be 
narrowl y tailored to promot e a compelling Government int erest." ). 
46. See Playboy Entm 't Grp. , 529 U.S. at 813 ("If a less restrictiv e alternative 
would serve th e Government's purpos e, th e legislatur e must use that 
alternative. "); Sable Commc 'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The 
Governm ent may , however , regulat e th e content of constitutionally 
protected speech in order to promot e a compelling int erest if it chooses 
t he least rest rict ive means to furt her t he articul ate d inte rest ."). 
47. See Re ed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 ("Governm ent regulation of speech is content 
based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed 
or the idea or message expressed."). 
48. Th e Supreme Court has explain ed th at "[a] regulation that serves 
purposes unrelate d to the content of expression is deemed neutral , even if 
it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others." 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). It has 
emphasized that "[t]he government 's purpose is the controlling 
consideration " in whether a regulation is cont ent neutral. Id .; see also 
Minch Minchin , A Doctr ine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-R eed 
Landscape , 22 COMM. L . & POL'Y 123, 124 (2017) ("If t he law only 
26 
 
CAS E WESTERN RESERVE LAW R EVIEW· VOLUME 69 · ISSUE 1 · 2018 
The Open Mic, Unplugged 
neutral regulation of speech is permissibl e if it is narrowl y tailor ed to 
serve a substantial or significant inter est and leaves open ample 
alternative channels of communication. 49 
Not only does th e First Amendm ent privileg e political speech under 
strict scrutiny , but it also safeguards diss enting political speech , which 
is expr ession critical of the government . P erh aps most signific antly , th e 
Supr eme Court in Cohen v. California 50 prot ect ed th e right of an 
individual to wear a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the 
Draft " through a public courthouse to express "his feelings against th e 
Vietnam War and the draft ."51 The Court reas oned that "so long as 
ther e is no showing of an int ent to incit e disob edience to or disruption 
of the draft , Cohen could not , consistently with th e First and 
Fourt eenth Amendm ents , be punish ed for asserting th e evident position 
on the inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected ."52 
Significantly , th e Court in Cohen also made it clea r both that: 1) th e 
possible offense tak en at Paul Rob ert Cohen 's message did not justify 
suppressing it; 53 and 2) speech is prot ect ed just as much for its emotiv e 
pow er as it is for its cognitive message .54 
In addition to Cohen, the Court in Texas v. Johnson 55 famously 
prot ected politic al dissent in th e form of burning the Am erican flag as 
regulates the t ime , place or manner of speech, t hen the much more 
government-friendly inte rmedi ate scrutin y standard is applied. ") . 
49. Ward, 491 U.S. at 803 . 
50. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
51. Id . at 16. 
52. Id . at 18. 
53. Here, t he Court emphasized t hat "t he State ha s no right to cleanse public 
debate t o the poin t where it is grammatically palatable to t he most 
squeamish among us. " Id . at 25. It added that thos e offended had a readily 
avail ab le remedy : they "could effect ively avoid furth er bomb ardment of 
t heir sensibilities simply by ave rting their eyes ." Id. at 21. 
54. On this point , th e Court reasoned: 
t hat much linguis t ic expression serves a du al communicative 
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relativ ely pr ecise, 
detac hed exp lication , but oth erwi se inexp ressible emot ions as well. 
In fact, words are ofte n chosen as much for their emotive as their 
cognitive force. W e cannot sanction th e view th at th e 
Constitution, while solicitou s of t he cogniti ve content of individual 
speech, has litt le or no regard for t ha t emotive function which, 
pra ct ica lly speaking, may often be th e more important element of 
th e overall message sought to be communicat ed. 
Id . at 26. 
55. 491 U.S . 397 (1989). 
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a form of symbolic expression. 56 In reaching this conclusion , Justice 
William Brennan reasoned for the majority that "[i1 f there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable ."57 Brennan specified that the 
Court had "not recognized an exception to this principle even where 
our flag has been involved ."58 
In summary , dissenting political speech - even when intemperate 
and offensive - is privileged under the First Amendment. Government 
efforts to restrict it , in turn, are subject to review under strict scrutiny . 
These foundational points are especially important to keep in mind 
when citizens engage in such expression at local government meetings 
and are punished for doing so. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND GOVERNMENT 
MEETINGS 
This part has two sections. Initially, Section A provides an overview 
of the general prohibition against viewpoint-based discrimination. 
Section B then addresses the public forum doctrine in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
A. Viewpoint Discrimination 
The ability to speak directly to a government board-be it a city 
council, a school board or a college board of trustees -i s perhaps the 
purest and most basic form of citizen participation. It may come as a 
surprise , then , that the Constitution is not understood to guarantee 
citizens a right to be heard before their elected officials make a decision; 
the Supreme Court said as much in a 1984 ruling involving labor 
negotiations in a community college district. 59 
Once an agency does agree to accept public comment, however , the 
commenting system cannot be operated in a viewpoint-restrictive way . 
As the Supreme Court wrote more than twenty years ago , " [v]iewpoint 
discrimination is ... an egregious form of content discrimination. The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the 
rationale for the restriction. "60 
That principle remains true today. Justice Kennedy explained in 
2017 that viewpoint discrimination constitutes "a form of speech 
56. Id. at 420. 
57. Id . at 414. 
58. Id. 
59. Minn . State Bd. for Cmty . Coils. v. Knight , 465 U.S . 271, 292 (1984). 
60. Rosenberg er v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
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suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional 
scrutiny. "6 1 He elaborated that such discrimination occurs when "the 
government has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on 
the views expressed. "62 
Thus, if the relevant subject or category of speech is abortion, 
viewpoint censorship occurs when the government allows pro-choice 
views but not pro-life ones .63 At a city council meeting, in turn, 
viewpoint discrimination transpires when the council stifles citizens who 
criticize measures the council supports but permits speech by 
individuals who laud them . 
B. Defining the Forum 
When a speaker seeks to use government-owned property as a 
platform for delivering a message, the degree of First Amendment 
protection depends partly on the nature of the property. Some property 
is recognized as being traditionally a "public forum" amenable to wide-
open public discourse, where speech generally cannot be restricted on 
the basis of content, such as a park or a sidewalk. 64 
Government property can become a forum by designation or 
tradition. In determining whether a designated public forum exists, 
courts look to the government 's policy and practice to assess whether a 
discernable intent exists to open the property for expressive purposes ; 
courts also look to the nature of the property and its compatibility with 
expressive activity. 65 
Once a piece of property is declared to be a "forum" by either 
tradition or designation , any regulation on the content of a speaker 's 
message is presumptively unconstitutional and is likely to be struck 
down if challenged. 66 Only if a judge finds under the strict-scrutiny 
standard that the restriction is absolutely necessary to achieve a 
compelling governmental purpose will the restriction be constitutional. 67 
Regardless of whether property is a forum by tradition or by 
61. Mata! v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J. , concurring). 
62. Id . at 1766. 
63. Clay Calvert , Beyond Trademarks and Offense: Tam and the Justices' 
Evolution on Free Speech, 2016-2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 25, 50. 
64. Unit ed States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
65. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
66. "Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be bas ed on cont ent 
alone , and may not be justified by reference to content alone ." Police 
Dep 't of Chi. v. Mosley , 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) . 
67. Citi zens United v. Fed. Election Comm 'n , 558 U.S . 310, 340 (2010) (citing 
Fed . Election Comm 'n v. Wis . Right to Life, Inc ., 551 U.S. 449, 464 
(2007)) (stating that the strict scrutiny standard analysis appli es to laws 
regulating political speech). 
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designation , th e government cannot pick and choose among viewpoints ; 
once the property is opened for one opinion, it must be open on equal 
t erms to all. 
But even in a public forum, the government can enforce reas onable 
regulations on th e use of property that are "cont ent neutral ," applying 
evenhand edly to all speakers .68 A regulation is content neutral if it is 
"justifi ed without reference to the content of th e regulated speech ."69 A 
classic exampl e of a constitutionally permissibl e "time , plac e and 
mann er " restriction is a limit on how long speakers may occupy th e 
podium . 7° For instance , a federal appeals court decid ed that a five-
minut e limit on speeches at a congressional hearing is a lawful , content-
neutral restriction .71 At leas t one federal appeals court has uph eld a 
residency requir ement for public commenters as a content-neutral tim e, 
plac e and manner restriction . 72 Moreover, government bodi es plainly 
may proscrib e disruptiv e interruptions by audience memb ers speaking 
outside of designat ed comment periods . 73 
Confusion arises when th e government seeks to restrict th e subject 
matter that speakers can address when using a government platform. 
Acknowl edging that not every pi ece of public prop erty is amenable to 
wid e-op en discours e, th e Supr eme Court recogniz ed a category of 
"limit ed " public forum , in which constitutional prot ections are 
relax ed .74 In a limit ed public forum , the First Am endm ent right to be 
heard may be confined to specific speakers and subjects . Cont ent-bas ed 
restrictions in a limit ed forum are reasonable if they are "consist ent 
with preserving the prop erty for the purpos e to which it is dedicat ed ."75 
While it is not entirely clea r how (if at all) a speaker's rights in a 
limit ed public forum are superior to thos e in a nonforum , at leas t this 
much seems widely acce pt ed: when th e government enforc es content-
bas ed restrictions on speech in a limit ed public forum , it must show 
th at thos e restrictions are tailor ed to advance an important public 
68. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
69. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Viol ence, 468 U.S . 288, 293 (1984). 
70. Wright v . Anthon y, 733 F.2d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1984). 
71. Id. 
72. Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2004). 
73. See generally Galena v. Leone , 638 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding 
dismissal of First Amendment claims aga inst chair of county commission 
who ejected a speaker from a meet ing for sta ndin g up from the audience 
and repeatedly objec t ing that the meeting was being held in violation of 
state open-meeting laws). 
74. Rosenberg er v. Recto r & Visito rs of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
75. DiLor eto v. Down ey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 967 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
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purpos e, whil e no "tailoring " is requir ed if th e prop erty is not a forum 
at all. 76 
Th e Supr eme Court set forth its "forum doctrin e" in a case about 
access to mailbox es in a public school. 77 In that case, Perry Education, 
a union want ed to plac e recruitm ent flyers in t eac hers' inbox es, noting 
th at th e boxes were built specifically for communicative purpos es. 78 The 
Court , howev er , found that th e box es were not a "forum" op en to 
general expr essive use , but rather, were limit ed by th eir nature to 
communications about official school busin ess by authorized users . 79 
Th erefor e, non-school org anizations had no constitutional right to insist 
on using the mailbox es.80 Ev en in a nonpublic forum , how ever , th e 
government cannot engage in viewpoint-based discrimin ation .81 
Wh eth er speakers have a constitutionally prot ect ed right to insist 
on delivering their chosen message to a public body depends , th en , on 
how th e forum doctrin e applies to a governmental board meeting . 
In th e t eac her-mailbox case, Perry Education, th e Supr eme Court 
its elf referenc ed school board meetings as an example of a designat ed 
forum , subject to the same exacting level of First Amendm ent scrutiny 
as a traditional public forum .82 That reference reli ed on a prior Supr eme 
Court ruling , City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission (hereinaft er , " WERC' ') ,83 in which the justic es struck 
down a discriminatory practic e forbidding t eachers from addressing th e 
school board about labor matt ers if they were not official 
representatives of th e bargaining unit .84 Pr edating Perry Education, the 
WERC ruling did not rely on categorizing th e forum status of a school 
board meeting . Rather , th e Court eva luat ed the prohibition on 
nonunion speakers as a prior restraint , and (without using forum 
76. See, e.g., Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1148 (Ohio Ct. App . 1997) 
( explaining that in a limit ed publi c forum, cont ent-bas ed restrictions mu st 
be narrowl y tailored to serve a significant government interest, while in a 
nonforum , restric t ions need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral). 
Quit e a bit of publicly owned prop erty is not any kind of forum beca use 
it is not amenabl e to any expre ssive use by the public , such as the int er ior 
office spaces within a courthouse , a pri son, or a public hospit al. 
77. Perry Educ. Ass'n v . Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n , 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
78. Id. at 40, 48. 
79. Id . at 47- 48. 
80. Id. 
81. Id . at 46; see also Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885- 86 
(2018). 
82. Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U .S. at 45 (citing City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. 
v. Wis. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n , 429 U.S. 167 (1976)). 
83. 429 U.S . 167, 176 (1976) . 
84. Id. at 177. 
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nom enclature) found th e restraint imp ermissibly content 
discriminatory: 
[t]o permit one side of a debat able public question to have a 
monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the 
antithesis of constitutional guarantees. Wh at ever its duties as an 
employer , when the board sits in public meetings to conduct 
public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be 
required to discriminate betwe en speakers on the basis of their 
employment , or the content of their speech .85 
In concurring , Justic e Willi am Brennan fram ed th e issu e in forum 
t erms , pr esag ing th e Court's formal recognition of the doctrin e in Perry 
Education. He wrot e that whil e the First Am endment do es not compel 
government officials to accept public input into th eir decisions , when a 
government body "open [s] its decisionmaking proc esses to public view 
and particip ation ," First Am endm ent guarantees attach to th e publi c' s 
involv ement : "In such a case , the state body has created a public forum 
dedicat ed to th e expr ession of views by th e general public ."86 And in 
Justic e Br ennan 's view, speakers may not be exclud ed from such a 
"forum " bas ed on the content of th eir message. 87 
If the Court 's words in Perry Education and WERC were tre at ed 
as the last ones, then th e analysis of speakers' rights would be a simple 
one: speech to a government body receives th e high est constitutional 
prot ection and may not be silenc ed or penali zed bas ed on content 
absent a compelling justification . Lower courts, how ever , hav e not 
consistently adh ered to this line of thinking . 
The forum doctrin e' s application has confounded courts, including 
the Supr eme Court. It has produc ed hard-to-r econcil e results as courts 
struggle with distinguishing betw een a "limited " and "designat ed " 
forum and grapple with th e permissibl e scope of a forum 's limitation .88 
85. Id . at 175- 76. 
86. Id . at 178-79 (Brennan , J ., concurring). 
87. Id. at 179. In his concurring opinion, Brennan relied principally on the 
Court 's 1972 ruling in Police Dept . of Chi . v. Mosley, in which t he Court 
held , on both First Amendm ent and Equal Prot ection grounds , that a 
municip ality cou ld not enforc e a select ive prohibition on certain types of 
picketing on sidewalks outs ide public schools. See id . ( citing 408 U.S . 92 
(1972)). In Police Dept . of Chi. , th e Court said: "Select ive exclu sions from 
a public forum ma y not be based on conte nt alone, and ma y not be 
just ified by reference to content alone. " Police Dept. of Chi ., 408 U.S. at 96. 
88. S ee Mark Rohr , Th e Ongoing Mystery of the Limit ed Public Forum, 33 
NOVA L . REV. 299, 306 (2009) (critiquing Supreme Court 's "dist inctly 
unh elpful " guidance in failing to clearly define what a limit ed public forum 
means); Lee Rudy, A Proc edural App roach to Lim ited Public Forum 
Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L .J. 1255, 1262-6 3 (1994-1995) (commenting 
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In their admirably thorough 2011 survey of cases involving speech at 
public meetings , T erri Day and Erin Bradford document ed how courts 
ha ve struggled to adapt the Suprem e Court 's shifting and unh elpful 
forum categories to governmental meetings .89 "It is fair to say ," th ey 
assert , "that th e circuit courts ' jurisprud ence in this area is a morass of 
confusion . "90 
As Day and Bradford obser ve, th ere may even be subcategories of 
'" limited' designat ed " and '" unlimit ed ' designated " forums to which 
different levels of prot ection apply .91 On e of the Supr eme Court 's 
seminal forum-spe ech cases, International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee ,92 indicat es that speech within th e range 
defining th e boundari es of th e limited forum receiv es th e fullest 
prot ection of th e First Am endm ent , just as would apply in a traditional 
public forum .93 
Safeg uarding th e rights of speakers in a "limit ed " forum has prov en 
challenging . Gov ernment agencies have adeptly convinced the courts to 
defer to content -based limitations that hav e th e effect of silencing 
citizen critics . In an illustrativ e case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for th e 
Second Circuit rul ed against th e editors of a high-school student 
newspap er in New York whos e editorial cartoon mocking the school 's 
sex-education program was censored , even though th e school had 
manifest ed an int ent to maint ain the publication as a public forum .94 
Beca use th e forum was "limit ed ," th e court held th e school had th e 
same authority as it would in a nonforum to remove any speech that 
"conflicts with th e school's legitimate pedagogical concerns . "95 As a 
result of such pond erous interpr etations , it is uncertain how much 
prot ection , if any, a speaker gains when public prop erty is identifi ed as 
a limit ed public forum as oppos ed to not being a forum at all. 
Th e prevailing view is that a public-comm ent session is mor e akin 
to a limit ed public forum , in which content discrimination is permissibl e 
and government restrictions are viewed mor e deferentially . At least four 
circuits hav e categorized th e open-mic period as a "limit ed " forum , in 
that "lower courts hav e struggl ed to apply the Perry standard equit ab ly 
to allow expression on public prop erty"). 
89. Terri Day & Erin Bradford , Civility in Government Meetings: Balancing 
First Amendm ent, Reputational Interests , and Efficiency, 10 FIR ST 
AMEND. L. REV . 57 (2011) . 
90. Id. at 77. 
91. Id. at 80. 
92. 505 U.S . 672 (1992). 
93. Id. at 678 . 
94. Ochshorn v. Ith aca City Sch. Dist., 645 F . 3d 533 (2d Cir. 2011). 
95. Id. at 540. 
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which content -b ased restrictions are permissibl e if th ey are reasonabl e 
and viewpoint-neutral. 96 However, other courts evaluating th e claims of 
silenced commenters hav e equivocat ed97 and some have gone as far as 
to classify public hearings as "designat ed " forums. 98 If a public-comm ent 
period qualifi es for th e mor e robust prot ection of a designat ed public 
forum in which content-based distinctions are disfavor ed , th en silencing 
or removing speakers on releva nce grounds becom es mor e difficult to 
justify , as relevance is a content-based rationale . 
Int erestingl y , courts in a handful of cases hav e been willing to 
extend prot ection even beyond th e podium .99 Expr essing dissatisfaction 
with remarks at a city council meeting by fleetingl y making a Naz i 
"heil" gesture from th e audience was held to be prot ected expressive 
conduct, 100 as was wearing a ninja mask whil e seat ed in th e audience as 
a form of prot est .101 In the Na zi salute case, the Ninth Circuit expr essed 
unwillingn ess to cut off th e public's right of expr ession at th e podium , 
noting that a contrary rule would permit ejection for non-disruptiv e 
conduct as insignificant as making a thumbs-down sign .102 
96. See, e.g., Galena v. Leone, 638 F. 3d 186, 199 (3d Cir . 2011); Fair child v. 
Liber ty Indep. Sch. Dist. , 597 F. 3d 747, 761-62 (5th Cir. 2010); Reza v. 
Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 2015); Barrett v. Walker Ct y. Sch. 
Dist. , 872 F.3d 1209, 1232 (11th Cir. 2017). 
97. See , e.g., Lower y v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 432 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (using "limit ed" and "designat ed " forums as synonyms in 
referring to a school board meet ing) ; Shero v . City of Grove , 510 F.3d 
1196, 1202-0 3 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that "it is not entirely clear 
whether a city council meetin g should be tr ea t ed as a 'designat ed publi c 
forum' or a ' limit ed publi c forum "' but finding that the plaintiff's 
challenge to a content -neutral time limi tat ion would fail under either 
standard). Day and Bradford provid e an exce llent analysis of the 
confusion over limit ed/ designate d status and conclude that a hybrid is 
t he proper way of viewing a citi zen-comment period. See Day & Bradford , 
supra note 89, at 81-82 . 
98. See, e.g., Zapach v. Dismuk e, 134 F. Supp. 2d 682, 690 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
(analyzing confusion among courts over forum status but concluding that 
a zoning board hearing is a "designate d " publi c forum, a view pot entially 
superseded by the Third Circuit's lat er Galena ruling). 
99. See , e.g., Stat e v. Kan e, 696 A.2d 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) 
( overturning conviction of audi ence memb er who was charged with 
disrupting a public meeting because he made only a brief ut tera nce from 
his seat asking to be heard on a point of inform at ion); see also City of 
Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1149 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating 
t ha t the entirety of a meeting of elected officials is a limited public forum 
"for di scussion of subjec ts related to t he duties of t hose officials"). 
100. See generally Norse v. City of Santa Cruz , 629 F .3d 966 (9th Cir. 2010). 
101. See City of Dayton , 707 N.E.2d at 1143, 1149. 
102. Norse , 629 F .3d at 976. 
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This raises intriguing possibl e arguments , since speakers hav e been 
remov ed and arrested for int errupting government meetings from th e 
audience as well as from th e podium . In one especially high-profil e case , 
a demonstrator attending th e Senat e confirmation hearing of Jeff 
Sessions for U.S. Attorn ey General was pros ecut ed for disord erly 
conduct, a charge eventually dropp ed , beca use she fleetingly laugh ed 
aloud when a senator prais ed Sessions for "tr eating all Am ericans 
equally und er th e law. "103 If th e First Amendm ent right to be heard 
encompass es the entir e room , th en a speaker like th e Louisian a t eacher 
dragg ed out of a school board meeting over an exchange with th e chair 
from th e audience could claim First Am endm ent prot ection even for 
prolonging a debate after her podium tim e has expired. 104 
III. EXAMINING THE PRIMARY J U STIFICATIO NS FOR 
R E STRICTING SPEECH 
Because a compelling government in te res t may override a speaker's 
First Amendmen t righ ts, it is useful to consider the primary rationales 
that government bodie s offer to ju st ify silencing or removing speakers. 
The y are set forth and reviewed below. 
A. Avoiding "Defamation " of Governm ent Employ ees 
When a journ alist questioned the validity of a Miami-Dade School 
Boar d polic y that prohibi ts "individual grievances" and "personal 
attac ks " during board meetings, the district 's attorney claimed the 
polic y was nece ssa ry to prevent member s of the public from defaming 
school employees. 105 Avoiding defamatory remarks is perhaps the 
weakest of the most commonly proffered jus t ifications for limiting 
citizen comments . 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed 
the nexus between injunction s on defamation and prior res tra ints , lOG it 
ha s never held that an injunc t ion directed at defam ato ry speech is 
103. Maya Salam , Case Is Dropped Against Activist Who Laughed at Jeff 
Sessions's Hearing, N .Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https: //www .nytimes.com/ 
2017/ 11/ 07 / us/ jeff-sessions-laughter -protester. htm l [ht tps:// perm a.cc/E7CR -
NXAM]. 
104. See supra not es 25- 26 and accompanying t ext (addressing this incid ent). 
105. Rowan Moore Gerety, Don 't Say My Name Unless You 're Saying Thank 
You , WLRN (July 24, 2016) , http: // wlrn.org /post/ don-t- say-my-nam e-
unl ess-youre-say ing-thank -you [https: / /pe rma.cc /E63 P-84P2 ]. 
106. Th e U.S. Supreme Court was poised to address in Tory v. Cochran , 544 
U.S. 734, 736 (2005), whether injunc t ions are permissible in defamat ion 
cases. It ultim ate ly did not decide that issue because t he plaintiff died 
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constitutional. 107 Conv ersely , stat e and federa l courts , alike, hav e widely 
recogni zed that equity will not enjoin defamation .108 
As early as 1839, a New York state court recogniz ed th e link 
between injunctions on libel and prior restraints in the case of 
Brandreth v. Lance. 109 Where th e plaintiff sought injunctiv e relief in 
anticipation of libelous speech, the court said that it could not "a ssum e 
jurisdiction of th e case pr esent ed .. . or of any oth er case of th e like 
nature , without . . . attempting to exercis e a power of prev entiv e 
justic e which . .. cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal 
consistently with th e principles of a free government" or without 
infringing on free speech. 110 
Inst ead , courts hav e long recogniz ed that damag es, not injunctions , 
are th e appropriate remed y in defamation cases . In other words , courts 
view subsequent punishment of actionable defamation preferable to any 
prior restraint of th e speech .111 Ev en befor e the adoption of th e First 
Am endm ent , "th e court in Respublica v. Oswald explain ed that 
although 'libelling [sic] is a great crime' it is well und erstood that 'a ny 
attempt to fett er th e press ' is unacceptable . Ev en though the 
defendant 's 'offenc e [sic] [was] great and persist ed in ,' th e Court did not 
enjoin th e defendant 's futur e speech. "112 
Prior restraints used in anticipation of defamatory speech have been 
held unconstitutional even wh en th e speaker has already display ed a 
history of engaging in such speech .113 A district court in th e District of 
107. Org anovo Holdings , In c. v. Dimitrov , 162 A.3d 102, 119 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
108. See RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF D EFAMATION § 9:85 (2d ed . 1999) ; 
Michael I. Meyerso n , The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint 
Doctrine: Red iscovering the Link Between the First Am endm ent and the 
Separation of Powers, 34 IND. L . R EV. 295, 308-11 , 324-30 (2001). 
109. 8 P aige Ch. 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1839). 
110. Id. at 26. 
111. Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunct ions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
157, 169 (2007). 
112. Id. (quoting Respublica v. Oswald , 1 Dall. 319, 324-25 , 328 (Pa . 1788)). 
113. Gold v. Maur er, 251 F. Supp. 3d 127, 129, 134- 35 (D.D.C. 2017); see also 
Demby v. English, 667 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla . Dist. Ct . App . 1995) (calling 
it a "well establish ed rule that equity will not enjoin eith er an actual or a 
t hreate ned defamat ion") ( quo t ing Unite d Sanit at ion Servs. of Hillsborough , 
Inc . v. City of Tampa , 302 So. 2d 435 (Fla . Dist . Ct. App. 1974)) ; Mazur 
v. Szporer , No. Civ.A. 03-00042(HHK), 2004 WL 1944849, at *7 (D.D.C. 
Jun e 1, 2004) ("An injunction is not available to prevent act ual or 
t hrea te ned publications of a defamatory character absent a showing of a 
'violation of some prop erty right, or some breach of trust or contra ct, ' or 
unless the defamator y langu age is 'used as coercion in connection with 
picketing; or is connected with violence or the injuring of property .'" ) 
(quoting Montgom ery Ward & Co. v. Unit ed Ret ail, Whol esale & Dep 't 
Store Emps. of America, 79 N.E.2d 46, 48, 50 (Ill. 1948)). 
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Columbia , for instanc e, recentl y held that a corporation's dir ectors were 
not entitled to a gag ord er against a former dir ector, even though he 
had already allegedly defamed them and was expected to mak e 
additional similar statements at an imp ending busin ess meeting. 114 Th e 
court was particularly concerned that th e gag ord er would be an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on First Amendment rights. 115 
Th e First Amendment strongly prot ects citizen speech to 
government officials addressing matt ers of public concern . Ind eed , th e 
First Am endm ent not only prot ects th e freedom of speech, but also th e 
freedom to petition government officials for a redress of grievances . A 
restraint on speech to elect ed bodi es imp erils both of th ese rights . 
A city, county, or school district tak es action only through th e acts 
of its employ ees .116 Critici zing th e way a government agency delivers 
services almost always requir es commenting on the performanc e of 
public employ ees . For this reas on , restraints on using nam es, dir ecting 
comments at particul ar memb ers of an elected body , or criticizing 
employ ees ' performanc e should never pass constitutional must er. 
Defamation law recogni zes that - especially wh en it comes to high-
ranking officials - criticism of government employ ees occupi es a 
uniqu ely prot ect ed status. The burden for a "public official " (such as a 
county commissioner or school superintendent) to win a defamation suit 
is purpos efully high , recogni zing th e need for citizens to feel confident 
they can safely voice dissatisfaction with government services or diss ent 
from government prioriti es .117 
Th e argument that criticism of employees must be forbidd en to 
prev ent defamation fails on two lega l grounds. First , not all critical 
speech is defamatory . Defamation requir es proof of a fals e statement of 
fact .118 Accurat ely describing wrongdoing by a school employ ee is a non-
defamator y act of constitutionally prot ect ed speech .119 Second , a 
114. Gold , 251 F. Supp. 3d at 137. 
115. Id . at 134- 35. 
116. See Will v . Mich. Dept . of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 79 (1989) ("The 
reason why States are 'bodies politic and corporate' is simple: just as a 
corporation is an entity that can act only through its agents, '[t ]he State 
is a poli t ical corporate bod y , can act only through agents , and can 
command only by laws.'" ) . 
117. S ee N.Y. Times Co. v . Sulliv an , 372 U.S. 254, 279- 80 (1964) (holdin g that 
t he First Amendment requires proof of actual malice before a publisher 
may be held respon sible for purport edly false statements leve led against 
an electe d publi c official) . 
118. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepp s, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986). 
119. In fact, at least one court has held that test imon y at a publi c meet ing 
about t he conduct of a school employee is privileged on t he grounds of 
conveying information to a governm ent agency about a matt er of publi c 
concern . Nod ar v . Balbr eath , 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984). 
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restraint on referring to identifiable individuals fails the constitutional 
test of "overbreadth, " since it restrains far more speech than is 
necessary to accomplish its objective. 120 
B. Enforcing Decorum and Civility 
Restrictions on commenters are somewhat more easily defensible if 
justified by reference to the government's interest in running a decorous 
meeting. Courts have at times found that "order" is a sufficient ly 
substantial governmenta l interest to justify removing speakers who 
express themselves in harsh or confrontationa l ways. 121 "Decorum, " 
however, is an expansive and elastic concept that can be abused . When 
government bodies appear to be insulating their own members against 
criticism rather than policing disorder, courts readily strike down 
speech-restrictive policies. 122 
Judges sometimes have difficulty assessing whether "decorum"-
motivated restrictions are content-based (because they involve the 
speaker's choice of words) or content -neu tral (because they might be 
triggered by an especially boisterous manner or tone) . Regulations that 
clearly seem targeted to the substance of a speaker's message are, at 
times, mistakenly deemed to be "content neutral." 
For example, a federal judge decided that a City of Topeka 
regulation prohibiting "personal, rude or slanderous remarks" at city 
counci l meetings was a constitutionally valid , content-neutral 
regulation. 123 But the rule should have been analyzed as content-based, 
because it targeted the speakers' choice of words rather than their 
120. See United States v. Stevens , 559 U.S 460, 473 (2010) (ho lding that a 
restriction on speech may be struck down "if a substantial numb er of its 
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's 
plainly legitim ate sweep") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U .S. 442 , 449 
n.6 (2008)). 
121. Se e, e.g., Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist ., 597 F .3d 747, 760 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (finding that avoidance of "naming or shaming " teachers was 
a legitimate governmental interest justifying a prohibition on speakers 
using th e public-comment period to discuss grievances against school 
emp loyees); Charnley v. Town of South Palm Beach, No. 13-81203-Civ-
Rosenberg/Hopkins , 2015 WL 12999749 , at *7-8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2015) 
(finding that "disparaging personal remarks" were unprotected speech in 
the limited public forum of a town council meeting , and citing other 
"decorum " cases in which "truculent" behavior, including repeatedly 
int errupting the chair , hav e been treated as grounds for silencing 
speakers) . 
122. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bryant , 30 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1171- 72 (D.N.M. 2014) 
(finding that proscription against "any negativ e mention" of members of 
the city council or their emp loyees at municipal meeting was viewpoint 
discriminatory and failed the test of strict scrutiny). 
123. Scroggins v. City of Top eka , 2 F. Supp . 2d 1362, 1372 (D . Kan. 1998). 
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method of delivery . Had th e judg e analyzed the rul e prop erly, it would 
hav e been declar ed unconstitutional beca use of its excessive breadth . 
"Rud e" and "personal " are not t erms with any accepted lega l definition , 
and any pot enti al speaker would be unabl e to anticipate what spe ech 
is and is not permitt ed , which is a red flag of unconstitutionality. 124 
Enforcing decorum by muting a citizen commenter risks giving 
effect to th e disfavor ed "heckler's veto ."125 Where th e government's 
rationale is that a speaker's opprobrious remarks might incit e oth ers to 
misbeh ave, th e constitutionally sounder respons e is to enforc e rul es 
against the audience's nonsp eech misbehavior. 
In the nam e of civility , board polici es commonly prohibit "personal 
attacks " ( or some vari ation of that formul ation) during the comment 
period . Wh ere "a ttack " is construed to mean "criticism ," especially if 
the restriction ext ends to public officials such as school superintendents 
or board memb ers , th e restriction is vuln era ble to challenge . As 
addressed below , courts are split as to wheth er a prohibition on 
"personal attacks" is disfavor ed as a restraint on content or viewpoint , 
or if it should be viewed as a content-neutral restraint on th e speaker's 
"mann er " of delivery. 
1. "P ersonal Att ack" Policies Stru ck Down 
Policies aga inst "personal attacks" do not typically survive 
constitutional scrutin y, but there is no clear consensus about how to 
analyze such policies. Typically , courts have deemed "attac ks " to be a 
viewpoint- or content-discriminatory term that connotes an intent to 
suppress only disapproval but not approval. 126 
For example, the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of a former county 
commissioner who claimed his First Amendment right s were violated 
when he was excluded from addressing the commission because he 
submitted a form indicating that he in tended to talk about the recently 
appointed county manager. 127 The speaker, Gregorio Mesa, had been 
124. See Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U .S 104, 108 (1972) ("[W]e insist 
t hat laws give the person of ordinary inte lligence a reasonable opportunity 
to know wh at is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws 
may trap the inno cent by not providing fair warning."). 
125. See Brown v. Louisian a, 383 U.S . 131, 133 n.1 (1966) ("Participants in an 
ord erly demonstration in a publi c pla ce are not charg eable with th e 
danger , unprovok ed except by the fact of the constitutionally protected 
demonstra t ion itself , that their critics might react with disorder or 
violence." ). 
126. See, e.g., MacQuigg v . Albuquerque Pub . Sch. Bd . of Educ. , No . 12-1137 
MCA/KEM, 2015 WL 13659218, at *5 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2015) (finding 
that "pe rsonal atta cks" policy is viewpoint-bas ed beca use it restricts only 
critical speech about government officials , including elected board 
members) . 
127. Mesa v. Whit e, 197 F.3d 1041, 1047- 48 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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part of a narrow majority that vot ed to fire th e county manager, but 
after a new election cycle changed th e makeup of th e commission , th e 
fired manag er was reinstat ed . Beca use Mesa 's antipathy for th e 
manag er was well known , the court found it reas onable to infer that 
the commission assumed his remarks would be critical. 128 Hence, his 
exclusion was content-based. 129 
A California federal district court struck down a school-district 
bylaw prohibiting "improp er conduct or remarks " by public present ers , 
finding it content-based and inad equat ely tailor ed to prot ect th e 
public 's ability to debat e th e fitn ess of school leaders .130 Th e district 
defined "improp er remarks " as "complaints against an individual 
employee ." A speaker who twic e was silenced while trying to raise 
qu estions about th e qualifications of th e district school superintendent 
sued to invalid at e th e bylaw, and a judg e found th e restrictions 
unconstitutional : 
[d]ebat e over publi c issues, including the qualificat ions and 
performance of public officials (such as a school superintendent), 
lies at the heart of the First Amendment ... Central to these 
principles is the abilit y to question and challenge the fitness of 
the administrative leader of a school district , especially in a forum 
created specifically to foster discussion about a community 's 
school system. t31 
Similarl y, a federal district court in New J ers ey viewed a school 
board 's prohibition on "personally dir ect ed " comments to be 
imp ermissibly content-discriminatory and insuffici ently tailor ed to 
serve th e purposes of th e forum . i32 And a federal district court in 
P ennsylvani a found th at an offend ed "sense of propri ety " was an 
unlawfully viewpoint-based reason for suppr essing a speaker who 
mention ed th e nam es of a pr esent and form er councilmember during 
remarks at a zoning hearing. i33 
Not all analyses, how ever , find content or viewpoint discrimination 
in a ban on "personal attacks. " In Virginia , the state 's attorney general 
issu ed an int erpr etation instructing th e Franklin City School Board to 
stop enforcing a regulation banning "personal attacks against 
128. Id . 
129. Id. at 1048. 
130. Leventhal v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 973 F. Supp. 951, 953, 957 (S.D. 
Cal. 1997). 
131. Id . at 958 ( citations omitted). 
132. Moore v. Asbury Park Bd . of Educ. , No . 05-2971, 2005 WL 2033687, at 
*9-10 (D.N.J . Aug. 23, 2005) . 
133. Zapa ch v. Dismuk e, 134 F. Supp. 2d 682, 693 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
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employ ees" and comments that "identify specific individuals " during 
the public portions of meetings .134 Attorn ey General Mark Herring 
concluded that the rul e was not bas ed on content, beca use it prohibit ed 
all mentions of identifiable peopl e (stud ents as well as employe es) and 
did not differentiate based on th e speaker's messag e.135 Neverth eless, 
even a content-neutral regulation can be struck down as invalid if it is 
unreasonabl y broad or vagu e- and th e Franklin school board 's flunk ed 
the test . 
Rega rding th e school board comment period as a "limited public 
forum " for th e expression of public views , Herring wrote th at the school 
board could not bar speakers from raising "personn el issu es or 
identifying individual school employees or officials during public 
session ."136 Th e school board 's lawy ers argued that speakers could 
requ est to air personn el grievances in a closed-door session, but Herring 
not ed that th ere is no assurance th e requ est will be granted: "I conclude 
th at allowing discussion of individual school employees only during 
closed session does not meet th e constitutional standard of ' leaving open 
ample channels of communication. "' 137 
Without deciding wheth er th e policy was content- or viewpoint-
bas ed , a federal court struck down the Virginia Beach school board 's 
polic y prohibiting "personal attacks," calling it an unconstitutional 
prior restraint. 138 The school district defended the restriction by 
insisting it applied only to "personal" remarks (such as "th e princip al 
is a liar ") and not to complaints about professional conduct (such as 
"the principal lied about spending th e mon ey" ) .139 But th e court found 
th at the regulation would inhibit speakers from voicing opinions about 
school officials beca use th e average person would not mak e such a 
distinction and would assume that any criticism mentioning an 
employ ee's nam e was forbidd en , essentially applying a vagueness -base d 
analysis rather than a strict, forum-bas ed analysis. 140 
A federal district court in California ord ered a school board not to 
enforc e a regulation prohibiting "charges or complaints against any 
134. Mark R. Herr ing, Att 'y Gen. of Va. , Opinion Letter on th e rul es of the 
Franklin City School Board rest rict ing the speec h of speakers at public 
meetings to the Hon . Richard L. (Rick) Morris , Va . House of Delegates 
Member (Apr. 15, 2016) , http: // ag.virginia.gov / files/ Opinions /2 016/ 15-
020_Morris.pdf [https: //pe rma.c c/ Y52B-RBPT ]. 
135. Id . at 2. 
136. Id . at 3. 
137. Id . 
138. Ba ch v. Sch. Bd. of Va. Beac h , 139 F . Supp. 2d 738 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
139. Id . at 742-43 . 
140. Id . at 743. 
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employee of the District" during board meetings. 141 The plaintiff, who 
was silenced and ultimately removed from the room by sheriffs ' deputies 
when addressing the board about why grievances against a principal 
and superintendent went unaddressed, argued that the rule violated her 
free-sp eech rights .142 The judge agreed , in a ruling that was primarily 
based on the California state constitution 's strong free-speech 
protections rather than on federal law. 143 The judge found that 
protecting employees against speech stigmatizing them or invading 
their privacy was not a compelling governm ent interest overriding the 
public 's right to be heard .144 (The judge also noted that the policy was 
not well-tailor ed to its purpose ; for instanc e, a speaker could reveal 
intimate personal information about an employee without violating the 
policy, as long as the disclosure was not a "charge" or a "complaint .")145 
2. "Personal Attack " Policies Uph eld 
While most courts disfavor policies against "personal attack" speech 
as content- or viewpoint-based, a handful of courts have found the 
restrictions constitutional. 
For example, the Fourth Circuit rejected a facial challenge to a 
county policy forbidding "personal attacks " by commenters at public 
meetings. 146 The plaintiff, who opposed a pending rezoning proposal , 
was cut off when he began criticizing how members of the commission 
behaved during the hearing. 147 The interruption escalated into a 
shouting match that ended with the commenter, Robert Steinburg , 
being led out in handcuffs. 148 The Fourth Circuit upheld the policy 
against "personal attacks" as a content-neutral restriction on the 
manner of speech: 
Because of government's substantial interest in having such 
meetings conducted with relative orderliness and fairness to all, 
officials presiding over such meetings must have discretion , under 
141. Baca v. Moreno Vall ey Unified Sch. Dist., 936 F. Supp. 719, 725, 738 
(C .D. Cal. 1996). 
142. Id . at 726- 27. 
143. Id . at 727- 28, 731- 32. 
144. Id . at 732- 33. 
145. Id. 
146. Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cty. Planning Comm'n, 527 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008). 
147. See id. at 382 (quoting plaintiff 's comments : "What you are talking about, 
I have no idea. Mr . Geck er, you in particular , lea ning over and saying 
this, that , and th e oth er thing , but I can t ell you from a perception 
standpoint from someone who is concerned, like myself and the others in 
this room , it 's not very flattering .") . 
148. Id. at 383. 
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the 'reasonable time, place and manner ' constitutional principle, 
to set subject matte r agendas, and to cut off speech which th ey 
reasonably perce ive to be, or immin entl y to thr eaten , a disruption 
of the ord erly and fair progr ess of the discussion , wheth er by 
virtue of it s irrelevance, its duration , or its very tone and 
manner. 149 
In a 2010 case, a federal appeals court refus ed to strike down a 
T exas schoo l district 's restrictions that forbad e speakers from using th e 
microphon e to air comp laints about specific district employ ees .150 A 
thr ee-judg e pan el of th e Fifth Circuit analyzed th e restriction as an 
ext ension of th e school district 's complaint-resolution proc ess .151 
Beca us e th e district had a complaint mechanism requiring grievances 
to first be pr esent ed to a lower-level district employ ee before the board 
would hear th em , th e judg es regarded th e restriction on speech as a 
legitim at e method of enforcing compliance with th e complaint 
proc edure .152 
Th e ruling is fairly narrow and it can be int erpr et ed as applying 
only to speech that involv es disput es with employ ees that are subject 
to a formal grievance proc edur e. That is different from saying th a t a 
board could constitutionally prohibit th e mention of any nam es, a much 
broad er restriction. 
C. R elevancy and Rep etition 
Some bodies provide a true "open mic " complaint oppor tunit y at 
which speakers may address any topic , but there is no constitutional 
imperative to do so . The Supreme Court has said that the Constitution 
affords no guarantee for the public to be hear d at government 
meetings. 153 More commonly, t he public-commen t period is limi t ed to 
matters currently before the board for consideration -or at least within 
the bod y's jurisdi ct ion , whether imminentl y pending or not .154 
When government bodies restrict public speakers on the grounds of 
efficiency, courts generally defer to those judgment calls. It is widely 
149. Id . at 385 (quoting Collinson v. Gott , 895 F.2d 994, 1000 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(Phillips , J. , concurr ing)). 
150. Fairchild v. Liber ty lndep. Sch . Dist ., 597 F.3d 747, 747-48 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
151. Id . at 751, 760. 
152. Id . at 760- 61. 
153. Minn . Sta te Bd . for Cmty. Coils. v. Knigh t , 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) 
("However wise or practicab le var ious leve ls of public participation in 
various kind s of policy decision may be, this Court has never held, and 
not hing in t he Constitution suggests it should hold, t ha t government must 
provide for such participa t ion .") . 
154. S ee id. at 284. 
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accepted that a government body can restrict speech addressing issues 
beyond either th e scope of the body 's jurisdiction or even th e scop e of 
the agenda of immin ently pending issu es. 155 Th e Supr eme Court 
appeared to countenance relevance-bas ed standards in its pr e-forum 
opinion in WERC , in th e context of a claim th at a speaker was 
selectively excluded on th e basis of union affiliation: "Pl ainly , public 
bodi es may confine their meetings to specified subj ect matt er and may 
hold nonpublic sessions to transact busin ess. "156 Courts commonly 
uphold th e authority of government bodi es to remove speakers on th e 
grounds of unduly repetitious or irrel eva nt testimony .157 
For exampl e, a Florida mayor was found to hav e authority to eject 
a speaker who refus ed rep eat ed requ ests from th e chairman to limit his 
comments to the it em on th e agenda and respond ed with belligerent 
remarks interpr et ed as thr ea tening. 158 Th e decision reli ed in part on 
deferring to th e split-second judgm ents th at a pr esiding officer must 
mak e "without th e benefit of leisur e reflection " in assessing whether a 
speaker will eventually get back on topic .159 Th e U.S. Court of App ea ls 
for th e Sixth Circuit found no First Am endment violation when th e 
par ents of high school football play ers were denied a repeat opportunity 
to air grievances about purport ed mistr ea tm ent by th e head coach .160 
Sinc e th e par ents had been fully heard once, th e desire to avoid wasting 
time with repetitious t estimony qualifi ed , in th e court 's view , as a 
content-neutral regulation of tim e, place and manner. 161 
Finally , a New Mexico court uph eld a school board 's prohibition on 
raising "personn el issu es" during th e public-comm ent period on 
relevance grounds. 162 Because th e board had minimal authority over 
155. See , e.g., Eichenlaub v. Twp . of Ind. , 385 F .3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2004) 
("[M]att ers pr esent ed at a citizen's forum may be limit ed to issues 
german e to town governm ent."); Breslin v. Dickin son Twp. , No. l:09- CV-
1396, 2012 WL 7177278 , at *14 (M.D. Pa. March 23, 2012). 
156. City of Madi son Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wi s. Emp't Relations Comm'n , 
429 U.S. 167, 176 n.8 (1976). 
157. White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1425- 26 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(recognizing mod erator 's role to limit "unduly repetitious or larg ely 
irreleva nt " comments). 
158. Jon es v. Heyman , 888 F.2d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 1989) . Th e government's 
case for enforcing relevanc e sta ndard s was bolstere d by the ava ilabilit y of 
a catc h-all commen t period at the end of each meet ing , of which the 
spea ker in Jones failed to take advant age of. Id . 
159. Id. 
160. Lowery v. J efferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 427 (6th Cir. 2009). 
161. Id . at 433- 34. 
162. MacQuigg v. Albuqu erqu e Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. , No. 12-1137 
MCA/KBM , 2015 WL 13659218, at *3- 4 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2015). 
44 
 
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW· VOLUME 69 · ISSUE 1 · 2018 
The Open Mic, Unplugged 
personnel matters except for hiring and firing the superintendent, the 
court found that the board could forbid discussion of personnel 
matt ers- except for commenting on the superintendent 's 
performance - in the name of maintaining decorum and order. 163 
D. Policing Disruptive Behavior 
When the speaker's behavior disrupts good order or imminently 
threatens to do so, the government's interest is at its highest and the 
speaker's is at its lowest. Regulations on the content of speech are more 
defensible when they are paired with some showing of disruptive 
conduct or effect. For instance, profanity cannot be categorically 
outlawed unless there is a showing that the speech was delivered in a 
disruptive or threatening way .164 
A government body may remove a speaker who causes a 
disturbance-shouting or refusing to leave after the expiration of a time 
limit-without violating the First Amendment. 165 In a 1966 case, New 
Jersey 's Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of applying a 
"disorderly persons " statute to a citizen activist who made 
"distract [ing]" remarks from the audience, threatened to escalate those 
remarks , and resisted removal by locking arms with another person .166 
The line of reasoning that speakers may be removed for disruptive 
behavior apart from their message is rooted in the Supreme Court 's 
0 'Brien standard , which recognizes that speech may be "incidental [ly]" 
burdened by regulations aimed at nonspeech conduct, so long as the 
restriction furthers an important government interest and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest. 167 
IV. THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND 
LICENSING REGIMES ON SPEECH 
A government regulation affecting speech is unconstitutional if, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court observed in 2007, "it fails to provide a person 
of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited , or is so 
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory 
163. Id . at *4. 
164. See Leonard v. Robinson , 477 F.3d 347, 359 (3d Cir. 2007). 
165. Kirkland v. Luken, 536 F . Supp. 2d 857, 881 (S.D. Ohio 2008); see also 
Whit e v. City of Norwalk , 900 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding 
an ordinance that prohibited speech during council meetings that 
"disrupts, disturbs or otherwise impedes the orderly conduct of th e 
Council meeting"). 
166. Sta t e v. Smith, 218 A.2d 147, 148-49, 153 (N.J. 1966). 
167. Unit ed Stat es v. O'Brien, 391 U .S. 367, 376- 78 (1968). 
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enforc ement. "168 More simply put , a law is "void for vaguen ess if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defin ed. "169 
The void for vagueness doctrin e flows from th e Fifth Am endment 's 
due proc ess clause .170 In applying th e doctrine , the Supr eme Court 
"consid er[s1 wheth er a statute is vagu e as applied to th e particular facts 
at issue , for '[a1 plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscrib ed cannot complain of th e vagueness of th e law as applied to 
the conduct of others ." '171 Thus , as the nation 's high court not ed in 
2010 , "a plaintiff whose speech is clearly proscrib ed cannot raise a 
successful vagueness claim und er the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendm ent for lack of notic e. And he certainly cannot do so bas ed on 
the speech of others. "172 
Additionally , courts may give a narrowing construction to 
oth erwise vague terms to save a statute.17 3 That 's because "[t ]he 
Supr eme Court has not ed that it is a 'ca rdinal principle ' of statutory 
interpr et ation that a federal court must accept any plausible 
interpr etation such that a state statute need not be invalid ated. "174 
Vagu e laws are probl ematic for several reasons . First , th ey can lead 
to self-censorship . As th e U.S. Supr eme Court observe d in striking down 
portions of th e Communications Decency Act of 1996, "[t ]he vagueness 
of such a regulation raises special First Amendm ent concerns because 
of its obvious chilling effect on free speech ."175 In other words , a vagu e 
168. Unit ed States v. William s, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2007) . 
169. Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U .S. 104, 108 (1972). 
170. Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 ("Vagueness doctr ine is an outgrowth not of 
the First Amendm ent , but of the Du e Proc ess Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment."). 
171. Hold er v. Hum anitari an Law Proj ect , 561 U.S. 1, 18- 19 (2010) (quoting 
Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flip side, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
495 (1982)). 
172. Id . at 20. 
173. See Abbe R. Gluck & Rich ar d A. Posner , Statutory Interpretation on the 
B ench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of App eals, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1340 (2018) ("Judg es almost always addr ess 
issues of vagueness by giving the statute a narrowing construction , rather 
than invalidat ing it ."). 
174. Stuar t Buck & Mark L. Rien zi, Federal Courts , Over-breadth , and 
Vaguen ess: Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to 
Uninterpreted State Statut es, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 381; see NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) ("The cardinal 
principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destro y. ") . 
175. Reno v. ACLU , 521 U .S. 844, 871- 72 (1997). 
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law may deter speech. 176 As Professor Fr ederick Schauer explain ed it , 
"[a1 chilling effect occurs when individuals seeking to engage in activity 
prot ect ed by the first amendment are deterr ed from so doing by 
governmental regulation not specifically dir ect ed at that prot ect ed 
activity ." 177 A chilling effect is constitutionally significant beca use, as 
Professor Leslie Kendrick noted , "prot ect ed expression is a particularly 
valuabl e activity toward which lega l rules must show special 
solicitude. "178 
Second , vagu e laws are troubling beca use of "[t ]he specter of 
arbitrary enforc ement . "179 This dang er exists beca use "[a] vagu e law 
allows th e government to tak e advantage of th e law's vague t erms to 
discriminat e in a manner not eas ily det ected ." 180 Wh en a vagu e law 
provides th e government with "unfett ered discr etion ,"181 un equal 
enforc ement may occur. As th e Supr eme Court has written , "[a] vague 
law imp ermissibly delega t es basic policy matters to polic emen , judg es, 
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis , with the 
attendant dang ers of arbitrary and discriminatory application ." 182 
All of this is exce edingly important beca use any policy impos ed on 
citizen commenters at government meetings is rip e for revi ew und er a 
vagu eness challenge, particularly when open-end ed t erms like "pers onal 
attack " and "irrelevant " are litt ered throughout th em . Elect ed officials 
can abuse definition al ambiguity to quash political speech at public 
meetings simply beca use th ey dislike th e viewpoint expressed. 
If th e public-comm ent mechanism op era tes as a "prior restraint " on 
speech - that is , if a government decision-m aker may deny a speaker 
the ability to be heard at all through a prior screening proc ess 183- th en 
that permitting proc ess is unconstitutional unl ess it meaningfully 
176. See Fr ederick Schau er, Fear, Risk and the Firs t Amendm ent: Unrave ling 
the Chilling Effect , 58 B.U . L . R EV. 685, 689 (1978) ("The very essence 
of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence .") . 
177. Id. at 693. 
178. Leslie Kendrick , Speech , Intent , and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1633, 1650 (2013). 
179. Andrew E. Goldsmith , The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court , Revisited , 30 A M. J. CRIM . L. 279, 286 (2003). 
180. David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges , 85 B.U. L . REV. 1333, 1359 
(2005) . 
181. Carissa Byrn e Hessick, Vagueness Principl es, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 
1143 (2016). 
182. Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104, 108- 09 (1972). 
183. See Se. Promotions , Ltd. v. Conrad , 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (defining a 
prior restra int as a policy or practice that gives "public officials th e power 
to deny use of a forum in advanc e of actual expr ession"). 
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constrains th e government's ability to play favorit es .184 Licensing 
requirements on speech must includ e "narrow , objectiv e, and definit e 
standards" to guide th e decision-mak er and to give th e speaker fair 
notic e of what is prohibit ed .185 Without such standards, a licensing 
regimen "ra ises the specter of content and viewpoint censorship ."186 
Licensing systems regularly are struck down as unconstitutional if th ey 
confer "unbridl ed discr etion " on th e permitting authority , as th e 
Supr eme Court did in invalidating a Georgia permitting ordinance that 
enabl ed th e county administrator to impos e ( or waive) fees to use public 
property for demonstrations bas ed on a wholly subjective assessment of 
the event : 
Th e decision how much to charge for police prot ect ion or 
administrative time - or even whether to charge at all-is left to 
the whim of the administrator. There are no art iculate d standards 
either in the ordinance or in the count y's established practice. 
The administ rat or is not required to rely on any objective factors . 
He need not provide any explanation for his decision , and that 
decision is unreview able _ is7 
Applying th e Supr eme Court 's "unbridl ed discr etion " cases, th e 
U.S . Court of App ea ls for th e Eleventh Circuit enjoined a Georgia 
school district from enforcing a multi-step permitting system that 
requir ed members of the public to first bring their complaints to a face-
to-fac e meeting with th e superintendent before being allowed to address 
the school board . iss Th e court found that th e policy constituted an 
unlawful prior restraint beca use it gave th e superintendent complete 
discretion to decid e whether to schedule a meeting with a complainant, 
which could indefinit ely delay th e complaint from reaching th e board. 189 
184. See , e.g., Bach v. Sch. Bd. of Va. Beach , 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 743 (E .D . 
Va. 2001) ( evaluating restrictions against criticism of school officials as a 
form of prior restraint). 
185. Shuttl eswor th v. City of Birmingham , 394 U.S. 147, 150- 51 (1969). 
186. City of Lakewood v. Pl ain Dea ler Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988). 
187. Forsyth Cty. v. Nat ionalist Movement , 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) . 
188. Barrett v. Walker Cty. Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2017). 
189. Id . at 1229. But see Fairchild v. Liberty Ind ep . Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747 
(5th Cir. 2010). Th ere, the Fift h Circuit summ arily rejecte d compari sons 
between a licensing system t hat requires neu tra l and objecti ve criteria 
versus a screening system for commenters at a school board, stating that 




CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW· VOLUME 69 · ISSUE 1 · 2018 
The Open Mic, Unplugged 
V. A CASE STUDY: MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA 
Restrictions on speech by concerned citizens have become an issue 
in Florida's Miami-Dade school system, one of the nation 's largest. 190 
The way the Miami-Dade School Board tries to constrain irrelevant or 
abusive speech is, in many ways, typical of local government efforts . As 
with many school districts , Miami-Dade bases its policies on a template 
provided by a commercial vendor of school handbooks , NEOLA. 
Formerly doing business as North East Ohio Learning Associates , 
NEOLA now claims a nationwide clientele of more than 1,500 school 
districts across six states . t91 It hosts the Miami-Dade school district's 
policies directly on its Neola.com website, 192 along with those of many 
other districts. 
Miami-Dade school board policies t93 restrict public comment in the 
following ways noteworthy for First Amendment purposes : 
1. Citizen's [sic] remarks should be directed to the presiding officer 
or the Board as a whole and not to individual Board members. 
Speakers may not address Board members by name and 
personal attacks against individual Board members, the Board 
as a whole, the Superintendent , or District staff are prohibited . 
2. Speakers commenting on agenda items shall confine their 
comments solely to the agenda item being discussed . During the 
public hearing, speakers must limit their remarks to matters 
related to the business of the District . Unless it is an agenda 
item, speakers are prohibited from discussing their own pending 
court cases and filed claims or complaints against the District 
or District personnel. Similarly, employees are prohibited from 
discussing any disciplinary matter that affects them 
individually unless it is an agenda item. 
3. Speakers may not use any form of profanity or loud abusive 
comments. 
4. Any action or noise that causes or creates an imminent threat 
of a disturbance or disruption , including but not limited to, 
clapping, applauding, heckling , shouting comments from the 
audience, or verbal outbursts in support or opposition to a 
speaker or his/her remarks is prohibited . No signs or placards 
190. Gerety, supra not e 105 (stating that members of the school board often 
interrupt complaining members of the public). 
191. Mission and History, NEOLA, http: // www.n eola .com/about/mission-
history / [https: //per ma.cc/GG8H-SS5J ] (last visited Sept. 21, 2018). 
192. See SCH. Bo . OF MIAMI-DADE CTY., BYLAWS & POLICIES (2011), 
http://www.neola.com/miamidade-fl/ [https://perma.cc/4ETN-PGUX ]. 
193. See SCH. Bo . OF MIAMI-DADE CTY., BYLA ws & POLICIES 0169.1 (2017), 
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shall be allowed in th e Board meeting . P ersons exiting th e 
Board meeting shall do so qui etly. 
5. The Chair may notify and warn speakers that th eir comments 
have gone beyond the subject matt er for which th ey had sign ed 
up to address , address matt ers that are not relat ed to the 
busin ess of the School District , constitute personal attacks on 
indi viduals or oth erwis e violate this policy . 
6. Th e Chair may turn off th e microphon e or recess th e meeting 
if a speaker persists in addressing irr elevant topics or engaging 
in pers onal attacks. Th e Ch air has th e authority aft er one 
warning to ord er th e remov al of th e speaker from th e meetings . 
Following a warning , any person making imp ertin ent or 
slanderous remarks or engag es in boisterous behavior which th e 
Chair or th e Board det ermin es constitutes an actual or an 
imminent thr ea t of a disturbance or disruption shall be barr ed 
from furth er app eara nce before th e Board for the balanc e of th e 
meeting. 194 
Bas ed on pr evailing First Am endment caselaw, the Miami-Dade 
polic y is vulnerable to constitutional challenge on several grounds. Most 
notably , th e policy goes furth er than simply prohibiting criticism of 
school employe es and even prohibits dir ecting comments at indi vidual 
school bo ard members by nam e. Whil e it is arguably unfair for a 
speaker to hav e a platform to bera te a low-level employ ee who is not 
present at th e meeting to defend herself, the school board members are 
present and hav e microphon es of th eir own. Any policy that insul ates 
elect ed officials from criticism is doubtfully constitutional. As a report er 
monitoring Miami-Dade school board meetings obs erv ed , polici es 
against "mentioning " names invites abuse, since a speaker almost never 
will be silenced for commending an employee - ind eed , report er Rowan 
Moor e Gerety witn essed several instanc es of speakers thanking people 
by nam e (including school board memb ers) without int erruption .195 
If the concern is to pr event what are commonly referr ed to as 
"personal attacks ," narrow er and mor e constitutionally sound 
alternatives exist . Because it is permissibl e for a government body to 
limit irrel eva nt speech, a firml y enforc ed relevancy standard should dea l 
with legitimately proscrib able speech . Remarks that are pur ely 
"personal "- for exampl e, airing an allegedly adulterous relationship 
involving a low-ranking city appoint ee196- can be rul ed out of ord er on 
rel eva nce grounds . But to be constitutional , th e relevanc e standard 
must apply even-hand edly , so that congratulating th at same city 
194. Id . at 0169.l(G)(l)-(6) . 
195. Se e Gerety, supra not e 105. 
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appoint ee on his wedding anniversary would be equally out-of-order. 
Dea ling with "person al attacks " by way of relevancy would permit a 
speaker to raise "personal " matt ers that are also pertin ent to public 
business . For instance , multiple personal bankruptci es or a large unp aid 
child-support debt might be r elevant in discussing wh eth er an applicant 
was fit to be hir ed as a county fin anci al administrator, or it might be 
relevant that the nomin ee for county school superintend ent sends her 
children to privat e school. 
Th e policy is also vuln erabl e beca use it: (1) categorically bans 
profanity without rega rd to whether th e profanity is disruptiv e ;197 (2) 
appears to prohibit clapping or applauding by audience m emb ers ;198 and 
(3) permits th e chair to eject a speaker for "impertinent " remarks. 199 
All of th ese forms of expr ess ion have been held to be constitutionally 
prot ected . In th e view of at leas t one judicial circuit , a prohibition on 
"personal , imp ertin ent , slanderous or profan e r emarks " is constitutional 
only if und erstood to apply to conduct disruptiv e to th e m eeting and 
not to words alone. 200 
Th e Miami-Dad e policy, and others like it , should be reexamin ed 
in light of th e growing body of constitutional caselaw disfavoring 
policies that invit e viewpoint discrimination . In particular , polici es 
motivat ed primarily by concerns for civility (such as "no-nam es" 
polici es) do not belong in a mandatory speech code th at can be enforc ed 
by forcibl e remo va l. Beca use it is unlik ely that any elect ed board will 
even-hand edly enforce a "no-nam es" policies regardl ess of the speaker 's 
viewpoint , th ese polici es are overbroad for th eir int end ed purpos e and 
are likely to result in viewpoint discrimin ation. School board members , 
lik e all elected officials , must tolerat e a certain amount of disagr eea bl e 
speech as the "cost of doing busin ess ." Polici es that penali ze harml ess 
speech in th e name of decorum are ill-advis ed invitations to litig ation. 
VI. THE CONSTIT UTIONALITY OF PUNISHING CITIZEN 
COMM EN TERS 
When a speaker occupying the podium at a public meeting runs 
a foul of the bod y's standards, the options for responding are limited. 
Speakers may: be in t errupted and told to conform to the rules ; have 
their time to spe ak cut short ; be ph ys icall y removed from the meeting; 
be arrested ; and even be banned from atte nding future meeting s . 
Un surpri singly , the more serious the consequences for the speech, the 
more justifica t ion t he government will hav e to produce. 
197. S ee BYLAWS & POLI CIE S § 0169.l(G)( 3). 
198. Id . at 0169.l(G)(4). 
199. Id. at 0169.l(G)(6). 
200. White v . City of Norwalk , 900 F .2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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A. Prosp ective Bans 
A prospective ban from future government meetings is, in a First 
Amendment sense , the most serious penalty an agency can impose 
because it restricts future speech as well as punishing past speech . 
Barring a speaker from addressing a government body ( or even 
attending the meetings at all) is functionally a prior restraint , which is 
presumptively unconstitutional. 201 Courts seldom , if ever , uphold 
directives forbidding future attendance at government meetings , even 
where speakers have caused a disturbance on past occasions. 
When the chairman of an Illinois school board shut off the 
microphone in the midst of a citizen activist's speech criticizing school 
personnel, Komaa Mnyofu responded with a federal lawsuit. 202 Mnyofu 
alleged that his speech was curtailed because of his unfavorable opinion, 
an act of unlawful viewpoint discrimination. 203 He challenged the 
board 's decision in U.S. district court as a violation of his First 
Amendment rights. 204 The district judge agreed that Mnyofu had a 
constitutionally protected right to use the public-comment period to 
criticize school employees-in fact , the judge wrote, the right is "clearly 
established " by decades of federal precedent. 205 
In an unusual maneuver, the school district filed a "preemptive 
strike" lawsuit attempting to bar Mnyofu from attending board 
meetings, arguing that his demeanor demonstrated a likelihood of future 
disruptive behavior. 206 The judge threw out the district 's case, finding 
that a government agency cannot preemptively ban a citizen from 
speaking at public meetings .207 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that an 
Arizona state senator violated "clearly established" law in issuing an 
edict banning those who "interrupt" proceedings from entering the 
Senate office building for two to four weeks. 208 The senator ordered 
Capitol police to place an immigrant-rights activist on a no-entry list 
201. See Neb. Pr ess Assoc. v. Stuart , 427 U .S. 539, 592 (1976) ; Bantam Books, 
Inc. v. Sullivan , 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
202. Mnyofu v. Bd. of Educ . of Rich High Sch. Dist. 227, No. 15 C 8884, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45773, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2016). 
203. Id . 
204. Id . at *1. 
205. Id . at *6-7 . 
206. Erin Ga llagher, Federal Judge Bars School District's Effort to Limit 
Comments, DAILY SOUTHTOWN (May 16, 2016, 7:32 PM), http: // 
www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs / daily-southtown/ news/ ct-sta-criticizing-school-
officials-st-0517-20160516-story.html. [https: / / perma.cc/ R6HJ-S4W 4]. 
207. Id . 
208. Reza v. Pearc e, 806 F.3d 497, 500- 01 (9th Cir . 2015). 
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after th e activist applauded and cheered loudly while seated in the 
"overflow " room watching a Senat e committee hea ring telecast from a 
nea rby room . Although th e rul e, and its application to speaker Salvador 
Reza, was found to be viewpoint-n eutral , it still failed th e t est of 
reasonablen ess beca use prosp ectiv ely banning a speaker from a 
government building without proof of dangerousn ess int erferes with th e 
speaker 's right to int erac t with elect ed repr esentativ es.209 Th e rule , both 
on its face and as applied to Reza, was deem ed unr easonabl e becaus e it 
failed to leave adequate alternative channels for th e speaker to 
communicate his messag e.210 
A federal district judg e in Or egon reac hed a similar conclusion in 
enjoining enforc ement of a city ordinanc e that allowed the city to 
ind efinit ely ban speakers from city council chambers for disrupting 
council meetings .211 Th e challenge was brought by a disability-rights 
advocate who was bann ed from City Hall for sixty days after shouting 
and pounding a t able to expr ess his distress when he was denied a 
chance to address a budg et matt er beca use he had bri efly left th e 
hea ring room when his turn was called .212 Whil e th e judge found that 
creating a disturbanc e at a council meeting could justify one-time 
removal from th e room , th e burden to justify a prospectiv e exclusion 
was greater. 213 The court found a sixty-day exclusion unreasonable on 
the basis of "mere speculation that some persons may mak e oth ers feel 
unsafe or engag e in additional disruptions . "214 Th e city 's proff ere d 
alternatives - that the speaker could watch meetings on t elevision and 
could mak e appointments to see council memb ers one on on e- did not 
provide reasonably adequate channels to be heard .215 
Similarl y, a federal district judg e in Michigan found a violation of 
"clearly established " law wh en th e chair of a school board had a 
dissatisfied par ent pr eemptiv ely bann ed from attendance at futur e 
board meetings and twice dir ected polic e to arrest him after he showed 
up at meetings in defiance of the ban . 216 Furthermor e, a federal court 
in P ennsylvania found that even a speaker 's concededly int emp era t e 
behavior at a series of school board meetings - swearing , challenging a 
board member to fight, and struggling with a guard who attempted to 
209. Id. at 504- 05. 
210. Id . 
211. Se e gen era lly Walsh v. Enge , 154 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Or. 2015). 
212. Id . at 1121- 22. 
213. Id. at 1132. 
214. Id . 
215. Id . at 1133. 
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restrain him - was not enough to justify a lifetim e ban from attending 
futur e meetings. 217 Although the dir ective was based on nonspe ech 
conduct, it was not narrowly tailor ed to furth er an important 
government interest and did not leav e th e speaker with adequate 
alternative channe ls to be heard .218 
Even a singl e prohibition on appearing before a municipal body can 
violat e th e First Amendm ent if motivat ed by th e content of past 
spe ech . Th e U.S. Court of Appe als for the Seventh Circuit held that a 
mayor violat ed the First Amendm ent by refusing to allow a citizen 
activist to address th e city council unl ess th e activist first apologized 
for berating a city employee at a public gathering several da ys ea rlier. 219 
As th ese cases mak e clear , government bodi es are constitutionally 
constrained from imposing retributiv e penalti es that int erfer e with 
citizens' ability to communicate with their elect ed officials , even if ther e 
is good reason to suspect that thos e communications will be hostil e.220 
Th e speculation that people who hav e acted uncivilly at past meetings 
will do so at futur e meetings is simply too att enuat ed to deprive citizens 
of their most dir ect and effective method of being heard on issu es of 
public concern . 
B. Arrests 
1. Th e Lozman Case Kicks the Constitution al Can Down the Road 
Good-government crusader Fane Lozman's second trip to the 
Supreme Court teed up the issue of when a speaker arrested for refusing 
to yield the podium at a public meeting may challenge his arrest and 
seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.221 
For a person whose First Amendment right s are infringed by an 
uncons t itutional , local-government prac t ice , the ave nues of recourse are 
limited. Government agencies are generally insulated by well-de veloped 
immunity doctrines from pa ying mone y dam ages for constitutional 
torts, 222 so the prevailing workaround ha s become suing the individual 
decision-makers. 
217. S ee generally Barna v. Bd. of Sch . Dir s. of Panth er Valley Sch. Dist., 143 
F. Supp. 3d 205 (M .D. Pa. 2015). 
218. Id . at 216. 
219. S ee Surita v. Hyd e, 665 F .3d 860 , 866, 872 (7th Cir . 2011). 
220. See generally Packingh am v. North Carolin a, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) 
(striking down a st at e's overbroad prohibition on social -media use by 
convicted sex offenders , in recognition that t he ban would interfere with 
the ability to parti cipate in harml ess political, social, and professional 
di scussions that pose no dang er to potential victims). 
221. S ee Lozman v. City of Rivi era Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018) . 
222. Se e Will v. Mich . Dep't of State Poli ce, 491 U .S. 58, 63 (1989) (holding 
t ha t a state agency is not a "person " liable for money damage s within the 
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Lozman appealed to th e Supr eme Court after his damag es claim 
against th e City of Rivi era Beach and its th en-mayor, Michael Brown , 
was reject ed by a jury in a verdict summarily uph eld by the Eleventh 
Circuit .223 The appeals court held that th e exist ence of probabl e cause 
for a misdem eanor charge of "Disturbing a Lawful Assembly " defeats a 
claim of retaliatory arrest as a matt er of law 224 - even though th at was 
not th e charge on which Lozman was actually arrested, which 
pros ecutors ultimat ely dropp ed anyway .225 The Eleventh Circuit relied 
on its prior ruling in a 2002 case involving an Alabama woman whos e 
ret aliatory-arrest claim against a police departm ent was dismiss ed 
because officers had probable cause to arrest her for th e felony charge 
of bribing a witn ess, even though a jury ultimately acquitted her of that 
charge .226 
The Supr eme Court accepted certiorari and, on an 8-1 vote with 
only Justice Clar ence Thomas dissenting , vacat ed th e Eleventh 
Circuit 's decision and remand ed. 227 The Court found that , under th e 
uniqu e set of facts present ed in Lozman's case, a retaliatory-arr est 
plaintiff should get the chance to plead and prove that his arrest was 
the product of a municipal policy decision motivat ed by animus over 
his exercise of constitutionally protect ed rights, even if genuine prob able 
cause to arrest exist ed .228 As th e justic es observ ed , th e central concern 
th at compelled th e Suprem e Court to recogni ze a categorical probable-
cause bar to a retaliatory-pros ecution claim in Hartman v. Moore 229 
does not apply when , as in Lozman 's case, the claim challenges a 
decision to arrest .230 
In Hartman , t ech-company executive William Moore was indict ed 
on charges of conspiracy and fraud involving an attempt to procure a 
contract to sell equipment to th e U.S . Postal Servic e.231 Moore sued the 
meaning of 42 U .S.C. § 1983, which permits recovery of damages from 
any "person" who infringes constitutional rights act ing under color of 
state law) . 
223. Lozman v. City of Rivi era Beac h, 681 F. App'x. 746 (11th Cir. 2017) (per 
curiam), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1945. 
224. Id . at 752. 
225. Id . at 749. 
226. See generally Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirmin g 
summary judgmen t in favor of t he Dothan , Alabama and several Doth an 
Police Depar t men t officers) . 
227. Lozman , 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018). 
228. Id . at 1955. 
229. 547 U.S. 250 (2006). 
230. Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1953-54 . 
231. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 253- 54. 
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federal agents who initiat ed th e pros ecution after the trial judge found 
the charges lacking in factual support and direct ed a judgm ent of 
acquittal. 232 Th e trial court and circuit court refused to grant th e federal 
agents' motion for summary judgment in Moore 's retaliatory-
pros ecution suit, which land ed th e case at th e Suprem e Court. 233 
Moor e's attorneys urg ed the justic es to apply the traditional 
burd en-shifting fram ework recogni zed for First Am endm ent retaliation 
cases in Mt . Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyl e,234 
discuss ed in greater detail lat er. But beca use of th e uniqu e concerns 
when a First Am endm ent claim challenges a decision to pros ecute , the 
justic es declined to apply Mt . Healthy and inst ead impos ed a high er 
initi al burd en to plead a retaliatory-pros ecution case. The Hartman 
Court found that probabl e cause conclusively forecloses a claim that a 
law- enforc ement agent wrongfully induc ed a pros ecutor to bring 
criminal charges, in part beca use of th e uniqu e probl ems of proof in 
trying to draw a cause -and-effect betw een the retaliatory animus of th e 
agent and th e pros ecutor's indep end ent decision to charge .235 Beca use 
pros ecutors are immune from damag es actions for th eir decision to bring 
charges, Justic e David Sout er wrote , a lawsuit will necessa rily be 
against someone a step remov ed from th e decision to pros ecute , which 
is entitl ed to a strong pr esumption of regularity .236 Th e Hartman Court 
found that it was fair to assign a plaintiff in a retaliatory-pros ecution 
case th e burden of pleading and proving a lack of probabl e cause 
beca use it would ultimat ely be th e plaintiff 's burden to demonstrat e 
that retaliation motivat ed th e charging decision and beca use th e 
exist ence of probabl e cause would (as a practical matt er) foreclos e a 
finding that th e pros ecution would not hav e occurr ed but-for th e 
invidious motiv e.237 
In Lozman, th e justic es distinguish ed Hartman and found that th e 
standard Mt. Healthy analysis for First Amendm ent retaliation cases 
provid ed adequate prot ection in the specific factual setting that Lozman 
present ed .238 In Mt . Healthy , the Court dev eloped a burd en-shifting 
fram ework for addressing First Amendm ent retaliation claims within 
the context of employer-employee relationships. 239 Under this t est , 
plaintiffs initially carry th e burd en of demonstrating th at th ey were 
232. Id . at 254-55 . 
233. Id . at 255- 56. 
234. 429 U.S. 274 (1977) . 
235. Hartman, 547 U .S. at 261- 62. 
236. Id . at 263. 
237. Id. at 265- 66. 
238. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach , 138 S. Ct . 1945, 1955 (2018) . 
239. Mt. Healthy , 429 U .S. at 287. 
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exerc1smg a constitutionally prot ect ed right and that, in turn , the 
exercis e of this right was a motivating factor for a meaningfully adverse 
retaliatory action tak en by th e government. 240 More simply put , 
plaintiffs must show three elements in a First Amendment ret aliation 
case - speech , causation and injury. In other words , th e plaintiffs ' 
exercis e of a prot ected First Am endment right (speech) was a 
motivating factor (causation) that result ed in harm (injury) suffered at 
the hands of th e government . 
Clearing this thr eshold in th e face of a government motion to 
dismiss is not a simple matter for plaintiffs . Since the Supr eme Court 
height ened th e standard for a complaint to withstand a motion to 
dismiss , Plaintiffs now must plead something greater than just "lab els 
and conclusions" and something "mor e than an unadorn ed , th e-
defendant-unlawfully-h arm ed-m e accusation ."241 In fact, "only a 
complaint th at states a plausibl e claim for relief surviv es a motion to 
dismiss . "242 To reac h this crucial thr eshold of plausibility - a level high er 
than mere conceivability - plaintiffs must set forth "fac tual content 
th at allows th e court to draw th e reasonabl e infer ence that th e 
defendant is liabl e for th e misconduct alleged." 243 
If plaintiffs satisfy these steps of th e Mt. Healthy test , then th e 
burd en shifts to th e government to show "by a preponderance of th e 
evid ence that it would hav e reach ed the same decision " against th e 
plaintiffs "even in th e absence of th e prot ect ed conduct ."244 Th e 
government is welcome here to raise th e issu e of probable cause to make 
an arrest as evidence that it would have arrested an indi vidual 
rega rdl ess of her exercising First Am endm ent prot ect ed rights. But th e 
exist ence of probabl e cause here und er a Mt. Healthy analysis is not 
outcom e det erminative or case killing. 
In Lozman , Justic e Kenn edy 's majority opinion emphasi zed th e 
uniqu e set of facts justifying application of the more forgiving Mt . 
Heal thy standard: Lozman provid ed evid ence of a pr emeditat ed 
municipal policy decision to punish him for constitutionally prot ect ed 
acts of expr ession and petition th at pr edat ed his arrest, th e policy bor e 
littl e relation to th e putativ e grounds for his arrest, and his speech was 
of great constitutional dignit y (addr essing elected officials on matters 
of public concern) .245 "On facts like these ," Justic e Kennedy wrote ," Mt. 
240. Id . 
241. Ashcroft v. Iqb al, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly , 550 U .S. 544, 548- 49 (2007). 
242. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
243. Id. at 678. 
244. Mt . Healthy , 429 U.S. at 287. 
245. Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1954- 55. 
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Healthy provid es the correct standard for assessing a retaliatory arrest 
claim. Th e Court need not , and does not , address th e elements requir ed 
to prov e a retaliatory arrest claim in oth er contexts ."246 
Analysts immediately seized on th e somewhat logically circular 
qualifi er- "facts like th ese"- to question th e helpfuln ess of th e Court 's 
guidance . Writing for SCOTUSblog , law professor Heidi Kitrosser 
observ ed that th e rhetorical shrug of "facts like th ese" might hav e been 
at hom e in a spoof articl e about judici al ind ecision on a satire websit e: 
"As for what happ ens next , our friends at Th e Onion might say, 'It 
depends. " >247 
More frustrating still for thos e seeking categorical guidance, 
Lozman repr esents th e Court 's second "punt " on th e issue in less than 
a decade. In a 2012 case involving th e ar rest of a Bush administration 
critic who confronted then-Vic e Presid ent Dick Ch eney during a public 
appearance at a shopping center , th e Court declined to decide th e 
und erlying issue of th e purport edly retali atory arr est. 248 Rather , th e 
Court simply resolved th e case in favor of th e defend ant Secret Servic e 
officers on qualifi ed immunity grounds, finding th e law insuffici ently 
clear to put a reasonable law enforc ement officer on notic e.249 
The Court 's hesitancy to coin a bro adly applicable legal standard 
where a narrow one would dispos e of th e case is consistent with Chief 
Justic e John Rob erts ' adherence to th e "av oidanc e" doctrine .250 That 
adherence was pr esent throughout th e Court 's 2018 term , as seen in th e 
Court 's standing-based dismiss al of a much-await ed (and as yet 
unr esolved on th e merits) case involving partis an-bas ed gerrymandering 
in th e Wisconsin legislatur e.251 
2. Th e Nieves Case: Avoiding Avoidance 
In it s 2018 term, the Court has an opportunit y to decide whether, 
out side the scenario presented in Lozman , the existence of probable 
cause norm ally will deprive a plaintiff of the oppor t uni ty to argue that 
246. Id . at 1955. 
247. Heidi Kitrosser , Opinion Analysis: With Facts Like These . . . , 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2018, 10:38 AM), http: //www .scotusblog.com/ 
2018/06/opinion -analysis-wit h-facts -like-these/ [ht tps:// perm a.cc/ 7RNW-
MXFQ]. 
248. Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 663 (2012). 
249. Id . at 664, 670. 
250. See generally Clay Calvert & Matt hew D. Bunk er , Fissures, Fractures €3 
Doctrinal Drifts: Paying the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for 
a Half Decade of Avoidance , Minimalism €3 Partisanship, 24 W M. & 
MARY BILL RTS . J. 943 (2016) (reviewing th e role of avoidance in First 
Amendment free speech cases under the leadership of Chief Jus t ice 
Rober ts ) . 
251. Gill v. Whitford , 138 S. Ct . 1916 (2018). 
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his arrest was retaliatory . Th e case, N ieves v. Bartlett ,252 involv es a 
partygoer arrested during a dispute with Alaska Stat e P atrol officers in 
which he int erj ect ed his opinion as th e officers were qu estioning an 
und erage -drinking suspect . 253 
If Fan e Lozman 's case pres ent ed uniqu ely sympathetic facts in th e 
speaker's favor - speech dir ect ed to elected officials on matt ers of public 
concern and a docum ent ed history of longstanding animus against th e 
speaker - th e Nieves case offers its mirror imag e. Th e "expr ession " that 
the plaintiff claims as th e provocation for th e retaliation was his refusal 
to talk to the officer. 254 Th e decision-maker was not a body of elected 
officials but a rank-and -file police officer. And th e setting was not th e 
staid confines of a commission meeting room , but a campsite party 
where alcohol was being consumed. 255 In sum, Nieves involves th e on-
the-spot decision of a polic e officer with no history of animus toward 
the speaker to mak e an arrest in a pot entiall y volatil e setting where 
safety was a concern - th e scenario in which judg es will be most inclin ed 
to defer to th e officer's judgm ent call. 256 Th e case comes to th e Court 
from th e Ninth Circuit 's reversal of parti al summary judgm ent to two 
defendant officers , relying on Ninth Circuit pr ecedent that th e exist ence 
of probabl e cause for arrest does not automatic ally divest a plaintiff of 
a First Am endm ent retaliation claim .257 
That Fan e Lozman 's and Russ ell Bartl ett 's dissimil ar cases pr esent 
the same constitutional issue demonstrat es th e need for a flexibl e 
standard to assess speakers' retaliation claims . The Mt . Healthy analytic 
fram ework supplies that standard. Mt. Healthy appropriately balanc es 
the int erests in retaliatory arrest cases. It initi ally impos es burd ens on 
252. Bartlett v. Nieves, 712 F. App 'x . 613 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted , 138 
S. Ct . 2709 (2018). 
253. Id . at 615 . 
254. Bartl ett v . Nieves, No. 4:15-cv-00004-SLG , 2016 WL 3702952, at *11 (D. 
Alaska July 7, 2016) , aff 'd in part and rev' d in part , 712 F . App 'x 613 , 
cert. granted , 138 S. Ct. 2709. 
255. See id. at *1. 
256. See Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 671 (2012) (Gin sburg , J. , 
concurring) ("Officers assigned to prot ect public officials must make 
singularly swift, on the spot , decisions whether the safety of the person 
they are guarding is in jeopardy . In performing that protective fun ct ion , 
they rightl y tak e into account words spok en to , or in th e proximity of, 
t he perso n whose safety is t heir charge. "). 
257. Bartlett , 712 F . App'x. at 616 (citing Ford v. City of Yakima , 706 F.3d 
1188, 1195- 96 (9th Cir . 2013)). 
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the plaintiff .258 Only if th e plaintiff satisfies those hurdl es does th e 
burd en eventually shift to th e government .259 
Th e Mt. Healthy framework substantially tracks th e formula 
deployed by most state statutes designed to counteract th e chilling 
effect of strategic lawsuits against public participation ("SLAPPs ") . At 
bottom , a retaliatory arrest based on th e exercise of th e First 
Am endm ent rights of free speech or petition is tantamount to a 
criminal, rath er than civil, SLAPP suit . Its purpos e is to squelch 
criticism on issu es of public concern . With a SLAPP suit, "[c]itiz en-
activists lose beca use th ey becom e dis enfranchis ed from th e democratic 
proc ess by lawsuits. "260 Ind eed , just as th e endgam e of a SLAPP is to 
stifle First Am endm ent rights , in a "claim for retaliatory arrest, th e 
injury occurs not beca use of th e arrest its elf, but by th e suppression of 
a constitutionally guarant eed right through means of an arrest ."261 
For instanc e, California 's anti-SLAPP statute allows th e victim of 
a SLAPP to mak e a speedy motion to strik e a complaint if, initially , 
the victim can demonstrat e that she was exercising th e "right of 
petition or free speech under the United Stat es Constitution or the 
Californi a Constitution in connection with a public issu e." 262 If th e 
t arget of a SLAPP satisfies this hurdl e, then the burden shifts to th e 
plaintiff - th e SLAPP er , as it were - to establish "there is a probability " 
th at it will pr evail on th e und erlying claim . 263 This burd en shifting is 
consistent with that embrac ed in the Mt. Healthy t est for retaliatory 
First Amendment claims . 
Imposing any greater burden on plaintiffs is counterintuitive where 
the defendant is a government agency accused of suppressing citizen 
speech addressing a matt er of public concern, which is subject to 
rigorous judicial revi ew.264 To impos e th e hurdl e of probabl e cause as 
an insurmountable burd en for Section 1983 plaintiffs contradicts th e 
intensiv e, searching scrutiny to which exclusions from a public forum 
should rightly be subjected. 
258. Mt. Health y City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U .S. 274, 287 (1977). 
259. Id . 
260. ROBERT D. RICHARDS, FREEDOM'S VOICE: THE P ERILOUS PR ESENT AND 
UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 26 (1998). 
261. Randolph A. Robinson II , Policing the Police : Protecting Civi l Remedies 
in Cases of R etaliatory Arr est, 89 DENVER U. L. R EV. 499, 514 (2012). 
262. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 425.16(b)(l) (2018). 
263. Id. 
264. Reed v. Town of Gilbert , 135 S. Ct. 2218 , 2226 (2015) ("Content-based 
laws- those that target speech based on its communicative cont ent - are 
presumptively uncons t itu t ional and may be justified only if the 
government prov es that th ey ar e narrowly tailored to serve comp elling 
state int erest s.") . 
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In rejecting Lozman 's claim , the Elev enth Circuit reli ed on case law 
dev eloped in th e context of damages claims dir ectly against th e 
arresting officers or th eir law- enforc ement agencies .265 Courts 
und erstandably hesitat e to second guess the arrest or don 't-arr est 
decisions mad e by rank-and-file law- enforc ement personnel at th e scene 
of a volatile situation, which is part of th e rationale for recogni zing the 
immunity bar. But where th e challenge is brought against an elected 
official who is both in the chain of command of law enforc ement and 
also is th e complainant who initiates the arrest, different equiti es apply . 
Th e inability to tailor th e analysis to a situation, such as Lozman 's, 
illustrat es why th e categorical probabl e-caus e bar reject ed by th e 
Lo zman Court was an invitation to injustic e. 
Because th e Mt. Healthy burden-shifting formulation enabl es a 
defendant to obtain summary judgm ent by showing that th e same 
arrest decision would have been mad e even absent a retaliatory motiv e, 
the fram ework provid es a sufficient safety valve to insulate police 
against unfound ed claims . If th e grounds for arrest are overwh elmingly 
obvious , th e defendant will obtain summary dismissal and will qualify 
und er 42 U .S.C. § 1988 for an award of attorney fees if th e claim is 
deemed "frivolous, unr easonable , or without foundation ."266 
In a recent gloss on anti-retaliation law , Heffernan v. City of 
Paterson ,267 the Suprem e Court held that a government employer could 
be liable for unlawful retaliation even where th ere is no act of lega lly 
protected expression, if the victim was punished for what th e decision-
mak er mistak enly beli eved he said .268 That th e victim did not int end to 
convey a message at all- in that case, carrying a political yard sign 
merely as an errand for a family memb er- was beside th e point , Justic e 
Steph en Br eyer wrote for the Heffernan majority. 269 What mattered was 
that th e government acted with a wrongfully speech-punitive 
motiv ation , and that if word got around the workplace that the agency 
had a practic e of firing employees who engag ed in prot ected political 
speech, it would chill oth er speakers. 270 
Th e same logic applies to th e arrested public commenter as well: 
when a government decision-maker acts with th e purpose of prev enting 
or punishing constitutionally prot ected speech, and that action causes 
the speaker harm, all the elements of a retaliation claim are satisfied, 
265. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beac h, 681 F. App'x. 746, 750- 51 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (citing Rankin v. Evans , 133 F .3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) 
and Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
266. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). 
267. 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016). 
268. Se e id. 
269. Id . at 1418. 
270. Id. at 1419. 
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rega rdl ess of th e form th e retaliation tak es. Ind eed , it has been said 
th at even an act of retaliation as immaterial as canceling a public 
employ ee' s birthday party might qualify as unlawfully retaliatory if 
intend ed to send a speech-suppressive messag e.271 Given that seemingly 
tri vial slights can be actionable acts of retaliation , it strains credulity 
th at ord ering the arrest of the speaker could be th e only government 
respons e to speech imp ervious to lega l review . 
Damag es actions und er Section 1983 carry self-evid ent det errent 
valu e. Beca use an elect ed body will, in all likelihood , hav e completed 
what ever decision was ongoing at th e time a speaker lost th e ability to 
be hea rd , and th e courts will not compel a "do-o ver " of a completed 
decision , after-the-fact recomp ense may be th e only remedy left for a 
speaker wrongfull y excluded from a governm ent forum. 
CONCL USION 
Locall y elected officials regularly trespass into constitutionally 
protec t ed territory in the name of main ta ining decorum and civility at 
government meetings . Policie s that forbid mentioning proper names or 
otherwise impermissibl y restrict speech are common. The se policies 
reflect an inadequate appreciation for the fractious me ssiness of 
participator y democracy. As the Supreme Court memorably opined in 
striking down restriction s on politic al speech in public schools : 
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough 
to overcome the right to freedom of expression . Any departure 
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble . Any variation 
from th e majority 's opinion may inspir e fear. Any word spoken , 
in class , in the lunchroom , or on the campus , that deviat es from 
the views of anoth er person may start an argum ent or cause a 
disturb ance. But our Constitution says we must take this 
risk ... and our history says that it is this sort of hazardou s 
freedom- this kind of openness- that is the basis of our nat ional 
stre ngth and of the independence and vigor of Americans who 
grow up and live in this relat ively permissive, often disput at ious, 
society. 272 
The most troubling situations are those like Fane Lozman 's-on es 
in which a commenter's refusal to refrain from irrelevant remarks 
escalates into a confrontation on the grounds of defiance of the chair's 
ins tructions. "Irrelevance" alone should never be grounds for an 
271. Ru ta n v . Republic an Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 n .8 (1990) (quoting 
Ru ta n v. Republican Party of 111., 868 F .2d 944, 954 n .4 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
272. Tink er v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508- 09 (1969). 
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arrest, 273 so it is difficult to see how even a full thr ee minut es of refusing 
to refrain from irr elevancy could be a criminally punishable disturbanc e. 
Irr elevant speech is not constitutionally unprotect ed , and a speaker 's 
failur e to conform to the chair's relevancy st andards , without more 
(such as shouting or oth er defiant behavior) should never be sufficient 
to sustain a criminal conviction. Giv en the apparent confusion over how 
heav ily citizen commenters may be restrict ed , clea r guidance from th e 
Supr eme Court in Bartlett or a future case about the level of protection 
afforded to speech at local-gov ernm ent meetings is badl y needed . 
As a practic al matter , managing the use of open-mic periods is often 
as simple as developing a thick er skin and strictly enforcing adh erence 
to content-neutral time limits . Lo zman illustrat es how an unwillingness 
to tol era t e disagr eea ble but harml ess speech can its elf disrupt a public 
meeting far more than the speech itself could have . Wh en Fan e Lozman 
was silenced by th e chair of th e city council , he was describing 
corruption charges brought against a former commissioner for the 
county that encompass es Rivi era Beach. 274 Th e comments were 
qu estionably relevant to any issue befor e the city council or within th e 
city council's jurisdiction , but if Lozman was pr eparing to connect his 
story to the matter before the council, he was not given th at chance. 
Had th e council simply "tun ed out " th e irr elevanci es and allowed 
Lozman 's time to expir e without incident , a dozen years of federal 
litigation could hav e been averted and, in turn , countless taxpayer 
dollars saved . Ultimately , even if courts dev elop a coherent consensus 
regarding when citizens can permissibly be stifled at government 
meetings , the onus rests squarely on government officials to heed those 
rules and , in th e proc ess, to recognize th e importanc e of the First 
Amendm ent rights of both free speech and petition in a self-governing 
democracy . 
273. See White v. City of Norw alk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(recognizing that "imp ertin ent " speech may be regar ded as unprot ect ed 
only if accompanied by di sru pt ive condu ct). 
274. See Lozman v . City of Rivi era Beach , 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1949 (2018) ("He 
bega n to di scuss the recent arrest of a former county official. 
Councilmember Wade inte rrupted Lozman, directing him to stop making 
those remar ks. Lozm an continu ed speaking , this tim e about th e arr est of 
a former official from th e city of West Palm Beach. ") . 
63 
